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Term Limits in State Legislative Elections:
Less Value for More Money?
STEVEN F. HUEFNER*

Our country's contemporary experiment with state legislative term limits is now
sufficiently underway to begin meaningfully to assess the actual impact of these limits
in a variety of areas. This Article considers whether term limits are providing less of
their promised salutary effects on legislative composition while at the same time
contributing to rising campaign costs. In particular, the Article focuses on data
suggesting that term limits have done nothing to halt, and instead may be one factor in
the continuing rapid escalation in both campaign expenditures and contributions.
Indeed, the author's pilot study of campaign financing in races for the Ohio legislature
found notable increases in several categories after the onset of term limits, and
provides greater detail than two previous studies about the nature of these changes in
particular types of legislative races. To the extent that these increases may be
associated with term limits, the Article argues that adoption of term limit measures has
done little to reduce the influence on the political process of special interests and
sophisticated political contributors. The Article also explores some implications of
these findings on state campaign finance reform efforts, arguing that absent substantial
change in the system of funding elections, term limits are not likely to deliver on their
promised diversification and purification of state legislatures.
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INTRODUCTION
Responding to a national fervor, twenty-one states in the early 1990s adopted
statutory or constitutional provisions limiting the number of years that an individual
could serve in the state's own legislature.' These measures attracted widespread
popular support 2 on the basis that they would oust entrenched representatives who had
lost touch with their constituents, free legislators from the control of special interests,
and restore law-making institutions to their proper composition by enabling a more
representative and diverse group of citizens to serve as lawmakers. 3 Opponents
predicted that term limits would not achieve these objectives, and instead would
deprive legislatures of their most experienced and capable members. Nevertheless, the
rapid adoption of these measures in close to half of the United States over only a few
years was but one sign of the increasing dissatisfaction many citizens were feeling with
the performance of their core democratic institutions.
Typically unwilling to impose term limits retroactively on their then-sitting
legislators, however, 5 most states chose not to preclude incumbents from seeking

1. Specifically, the twenty-one states were: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See infra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text. Most of these states' provisions also limited the number of
terms that a person could serve that state in the United States Congress. In addition, three other
states-Alaska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota-imposed only congressionalterm limits.
See infra note 63.
2. Indeed, all but two were adopted by popular initiative, typically by wide margins and
often in the face of legislative opposition. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
5. At the congressional level, states also were loath to "term out" their own delegation
unilaterally, and thereby leave to other states the powers and benefits of congressional seniority.
For a thorough discussion of this collective action problem, see Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits
Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83, 85-86, 114-54 (1997).
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reelection until six to twelve years in the future.6 In only two states did term limits
provisions begin to displace state legislators as early as 1996, when incumbents in the
Maine legislature and the California legislature were precluded from seeking
reelection. In 1998, incumbents in the Colorado legislature and the lower houses of the
Arkansas, Michigan, and Oregon legislatures first felt the preclusive effect of their
states' term limits provisions. The election of 2000 then witnessed the largest single
impact of term limits, 7 as incumbent legislators in both houses of the legislatures of
five more states-Arizona, Florida, Montana, Ohio, and South Dakota-as well as the
upper house of the Arkansas legislature, were prevented from remaining in office.8
The time thus is now ripe to begin to assess how legislative term limits may be
affecting, and may continue to affect, the operations of state legislatures around the
country. Over the past decade, several legal commentators have offered predictions
about the impact or desirability of legislative term limits, but their focus was primarily
on term limits in Congress, and their work was necessarily constrained by a lack of
empirical data concerning the impact of term limits on legislative life. 9 Although that
constraint no longer precludes analysis of the effects of term limits in well over half the
states with term-limit provisions, almost no legal scholarship has yet addressed the
actual impact of term limits on state legislative processes.' 0 The number of topics in

6. In 1995, before the effective date of these provisions had arrived, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated limits on congressional terms as violating the U.S. Constitution. See
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Similarly, under provisions of their
state constitutions, state courts in Nebraska, Massachusetts, Washington, and Oregon struck
down their limits on state legislative terms in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, respectively. See
infra notes 88-90. Nebraska then adopted another term limits provision in 2000. See infra note
89. In February 2002, the Idaho legislature voted to repeal Idaho's statutory term limits
provision, and in March 2003 the Utah legislature similarly repealed Utah's statutory term limit,
leaving sixteen states today with effective legislative term limits measures. See infra note 91.
7. The National Conference of State Legislatures reported that, as a result of term limits, 52
state legislators nationwide were termed out in 1996, 203 were termed out in 1998, 380 were
termed out in 2000, and 322 were termed out in 2002. See National Conference of State
Legislatures, Members Termed Out: 1996-2002 (on file with author).

8. In 2002, term limits took effect in Michigan's upper house, as well as in both houses of
the Missouri legislature. Oregon's upper house also would have felt the impact of term limits in
2002, had the Oregon Supreme Court not invalidated the state's term limit provision early that
year. See infra note 90. Over the upcoming elections of 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010, the
five remaining states with legislative term limits--Oklahoma, Wyoming, Louisiana, Nebraska,
and Nevada, respectively-will first experience the direct effect of term limits.
9. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 5; Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitationsand the Myth ofthe
Citizen-Legislator,81 CORNELL L. REV. 623 (1996); Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term
Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 (1992); Erik H. Corwin, Recent Developments: Limits on Legislative
Terms: Legal and Policy Implications,28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569 (1991).
10. One state legislator has written a short recounting of some effects of term limits. See
Rhine L. McLin, The Hidden Effects of Term Limits: Losing the Voices of Experience and
Diversity, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 539 (2001). Preliminary political science analyses suggest that
term limits are not fundamentally altering the characteristics of the legislators themselves, but
are altering the balance of power among various legislative actors, such as representatives,
lobbyists, party leaders, and legislative staff. See, e.g., THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH
LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2003); MARY HAWKESWORTH & KATHERINE
E. KLEEMAN,

CENTER FOR AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS, TERM LIMITS AND

/Term%20LimitsFullReport.pdf;

THE

http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/-cawp/Research/Reports
JOHN M. CAREY ET AL., TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE

REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (2001), at
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need of continuing study in this area is large and likely to evolve as the impact of state
legislative term limits changes over time.
One topic deserving attention is the relationship between term limits and campaign
financing in legislative races. Individual states have long experimented with a variety
of measures to regulate the influence of money in politics." 1Indeed, many of the same
concerns that prompted states to adopt term limits-such as a drive to reduce the
influence of special interests and to encourage a greater and more "representative"
range of citizens to serve as lawmakers-also underlie efforts to control the financing
of political campaigns. Are these efforts synergistic? Are they merely duplicative? Or
might the interplay between term limits and some forms of campaign finance reform
perhaps be more complex, and even antagonistic?
This Article begins to explore these questions by considering the experiences to
date of California, Michigan, and Ohio, whose term limits provisions first applied to at
least one house of their state legislatures in 1996, 1998, and 2000, respectively. The
Article includes a preliminary study of Ohio's recent state legislative elections that
shows, in greater depth than previous California and Michigan studies, sizable
increases in certain campaign costs after term limits, particularly at the primary
election stage. Although it is somewhat early to determine just how much
responsibility term limits bear for increases in state campaign expenditures, these data
at least suggest that term limits have failed to reduce the influence of money in the
electoral process. The Article concludes that this failure provides another basis to
question the wisdom of not only term limits themselves, but also the larger campaign
finance landscape created by the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo.12
In addition, the continuing financial demands of competing for open seats even in
term-limited legislatures provide further reason to favor certain types of campaign
finance reform for state legislatures, namely public funding or partial removal of
contribution limits.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the recent termlimits and campaign finance reform movements. After reviewing the principal
justifications offered for each movement, this Part also summarizes key predictions
about the impact of term limits on the types of candidates seeking and winning
representative office, and on the influence of money in politics.
Part It then presents campaign data relevant to these predictions. This Part first
examines previous reports and studies that address the impact of term limits on the
election of state legislators. The bulk of this Part then presents a new and more detailed
pilot study of legislative elections in Ohio between 1996 and 2000, when Ohio's term
limit provision first precluded state legislators from seeking reelection. Part H
concludes by summarizing several studies of the effect of term limits on the
LEGISLATURES (2000); see infra notes

193-212 and accompanying text.

11. See infra note 41. Over the past decade, the issue of campaign finance reform also has
taken on an increasingly high national profile, culminating in its prominent position in the 2000
presidential election and in the subsequent congressional agenda, ultimately leading to the
enactment in 2002 of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act. Although the issue was
shelved temporarily after the events of September 11, 2001, the Enron debacle brought it back
to life. See N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2002, at Al; N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 48-50. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), enhances the possibility that the
Court itself may be questioning the Buckley framework, although this framework continues to
dominate the campaign finance landscape.
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composition of state legislatures, finding that essentially the same type of candidates
continue to win election under term limits.
Part III reflects on these empirical findings concerning the effects of term limits on
both campaign costs and the characteristics of legislative candidates. In addition to
identifying some questions in need of further study, this Part explores the implications
of the present findings on other aspects of the ongoing dialogue about both term limits
and campaign finance. This Part also discusses possible adjustments to the election
processes for state legislators. Absent some such adjustment, term limits will continue
to have an adverse effect on state legislatures, rather than helping to produce a more
diverse and publicly responsive group of legislators.
I. CYNICISM AND DISTRUST: COMMON ORIGINS OF TERM LIMITS AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM

Although driven by different groups of core proponents, both the term limits
movement of the 1990s and the ongoing campaign finance reform movement have
drawn upon widespread popular discord about the unresponsiveness of government
institutions and the improper motives of elected officials. Because the battle that led
twenty-one states to adopt some form of term-limits measure for state legislators
between 1990 and 1995 occurred at a time when federal constitutional law seemed
inhospitable to many potential campaign finance reforms, term limits may have served
at least to some supporters as an alternative means of checking the influence of special
interests on the political process. Nevertheless, even states with term limits have
continued to pursue a variety of campaign finance reforms, and have generally done so
without regard to how term limits have altered the campaign landscape. Meanwhile,
several key justifications for legislative term limits also have involved severing or at
least weakening the link between special interests and elected officials.
A. ContemporaryFrustrationwith Democratic Institutions
Fed largely by cynicism about the operation of the federal government (and
Congress in particular) during an era of divided party control, the term limits
movement in the early 1990s also took root in a more universal distrust of politicians
generally. 3 Supporters of term limits argued that in contemporary America, entrenched
legislators had lost touch with their constituents, become beholden to a narrow group
of special interests, and pursued careerism at the expense of the public good.14 These
perceived characteristics of a political system run by "career politicians" were not only
considered bad in themselves, but also were blamed as a significant factor in voter
apathy and in the high level of citizen disinterest in-and distrust of-politics
generally.' 5
The hostility towards career or "professional" politicians that fed the term limits
movement drew at least some of its strength from the idea of a "citizen legislator." The
best-known historical example is that of the Fifth-Century B.C. Roman patriot Lucius

13. Cf. Alan Rosenthal, The Effects of Term Limits on Legislatures: A Comment, in
LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 205 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992)
(describing anger at Congress as key cause of state term limits).
14. See Corwin, supra note 9, at 605; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 88 & n.10.
15. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 9, at 480.
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Quinctius Cincinnatus, renowned for twice abandoning his plow for transitory service
as the Roman dictator. Each time, the story is told, Cincinnatus served briefly, and only
as long as necessary to defend his city from
hostile threats. At that point, he resigned
16
the dictatorship and returned to his farm.
George Washington's revered example of voluntarily quitting the Presidency after
two terms, coupled with other stories of the ways in which many of the Framers served
as politicians for short but critical periods, 17 have embedded the appeal of the legend
of Cincinnatus in American society.' 8 Some of the appeal of this legend inevitably lies
in the sense it conveys that citizens living "ordinary" lives can, through punctuated
efforts at service, make valuable political contributions to their community and society.
But certainly another aspect of the appeal is Cincinnatus' apparent lack of ambition or
glory. Both aspects are related in the modem-day appeal of term limits: "Career"
politicians are distrusted because of the perception that they are highly ambitious and
self-serving. 19 In turn, their pursuit of this ambition is perceived as antithetical to the
public interest. This conflict arises because careerist ambition distorts politicians'
ability to represent "ordinary" citizens by driving them to curry favor with narrow
interest groups, and also because continuous "professionalized" pursuit of public office
displaces truly public-spirited individuals
from serving for brief periods as elected
20
representatives of their communities.
Accordingly, in the 1990s many citizens articulated frustration with career
politicians both in terms of the lack of representativeness of elected officials, and in
terms of the corrupting effect of money in politics. In many states, these two distinct
frustrations with career politicians were both shaped by the increasing
"professionalization" of legislative institutions, a development that occurred primarily
in the 1960s and 1970s.2 1In some states, memories were still fresh of the days when
the state's legislators, like Cincinnatus, had come in from the fields to handle the

16. See Richard H. Underwood, Perjury:An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J.
308 (1996).

INT'L & COMP.

L. 307,

17. See GIDEON DORON & MICHAEL HARRIS, TERM LiMITs 7-10 (2001); John H. Fund,
Term Limitation:An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in LIMrrING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 225,226-27
(Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992); Mark P. Petracca, Rotation in Office: The
History of an Idea, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 19, 29-36 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J.
Malbin eds., 1992).
18. Prominent examples of rotation in office exist beyond the founding era as well.
Abraham Lincoln, for instance, relinquished his congressional seat after a term to keep a
rotation agreement he had made with intra-party political rivals. See Charles R. Kesler, Bad
Housekeeping: The CaseAgainst CongressionalTerm Limits, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS
241, 244 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).
19. Indeed, this ambition is the typical assumption in studies of political behavior. See,
e.g., CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 3; GARY F. MONCRIEF Er AL., WHO RUNS FOR THE
LEGISLATURE? 29-30 (2001).
20. Accordingly, some term limits supporters described their virtues in terms of removing
barriers to entry. See Einer Elhauge et al., How Term Limits Enhance the Expression of
DemocraticPreferences,5 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 59, 68-69 (1997).
21. A wide variety exists in the level of professionalization of state legislatures around the
country. As the term is typically understood, a "professional" legislature is one that is in session
at most seasons of the year, pays legislators well, and employs a meaningful complement of
staff. See Bruce E. Cain & Mark A. Levin, Term Limits, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITCAL
SCIENCE, 1999, at 163, 173; CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 145-49; MONCRIEF ET AL., supra

note 19, at 21.
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necessary legislative business for a brief season of only a few weeks every other year,
received only a small stipend for their service, and then returned home to take up their
plows again.2 2 In contrast, the professionalization of state legislatures that occurred in
the latter twentieth century seemed to have encouraged a new type of careerism among
23
many states' legislators. This professionalization contributed to dramatic increases in
campaign costs and gave interest groups a more powerful place at the policy-making
table.24 Professionalization also discouraged many types of citizens from serving as
elected officials, as legislatures became more labor-intensive and institutionalized.25
This is not to say that professionalism alone accounted for the cynicism and
hostility towards state legislatures, but rather that public perceptions of "career
politicians" seem to have contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with representative
democracy. 26 It was therefore easy for mounting frustrations with Congress to spill
27
over against the increasingly professionalized state legislatures as well. At the center

22. Cf. William Pound, State Legislative Careers: Twenty-Five Years of Reform, in
CHANGING PATIERNS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CAREERS 9-15 (Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A.

Thompson eds., 1992) (describing recent rapid changes in legislative salaries, staff levels, and
lengths of session).
23. For example, 43% (57 of the 132 members) of Ohio's 124th General Assembly (200102) self-identified their occupation solely as full-time legislator. See generally THE OHIO
SENATE,

124TH

REPRESENTATIVES,

GENERAL ASSEMBLY (on file with author); THE OHIO HOUSE OF
124TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (on file with author). This is in marked contrast

to Petracca's data showing that with the advent of term limits in California (the state generally
regarded as having the most professional legislature), the percentage of California legislators
who call themselves full-time legislators had dropped from 36% in 1986 to 3.4% in 1995. See
MARK P. PETRACCA, A LEGISLATURE IN TRANSITION: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE WITH TERM

LIMrrs 19 (Institute of Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 96-19, 1996), cited in Cain &
Levin, supra note 21, at 175. But see Richard A. Clucas, California:The New Amateur Politics,
in THE TEST OF TIME 17, 22-23 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2003) (finding 47% of California

Assembly and 37% of California Senate members--"record numbers"-isting legislative
service as their career in 1999).
24. See Gary F. Moncrief, CandidateSpending in State Legislative Races, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE

IN

STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 47 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds.,

1998); William E. Cassie & Joel A. Thompson, Patterns of PAC Contributions to State
Legislative Candidates,in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 166-67 (Joel A.

Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds., 1998).
25. See MONCRIEF Er AL., supra note 19, at 23.
26. For instance, of four categories of term limits supporters articulated by Robert Kurfirst
(and employed by Cain & Levin), three are premised on different visions of the value of amateur
politics. See Cain & Levin, supra note 21, at 168-72. Furthermore, there appears to be some
correlation between the level of professionalization of a state's legislature and the harshness of
its particular term limits measure, with more professionalized legislatures subject to shorter term
limits. See id. at 166-67, 173.
27. See, e.g., Sandy Theis, Ex-Opponent Backs Term Limits, DAYTON DAILY NEwS, Nov.
11, 1991, at A3 (reporting state legislator's observation that "disgust with Congress" was
fueling interest in state term limits); Mark Petracca, PoliticalCareerismIs the Bane of True
Democracy,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1990, at A26 ("Professionalism and careerism in politics [are]
the bane of democratic governance."); GERALD BENJAMIN & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, Preface, in
LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS, at xi (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992) (blaming
rise of political careerism for public cynicism towards legislatures). Ironically, the late-twentieth
century professionalization of state legislatures in part responded to earlier concerns about
excessive legislative turnover. See David H. Everson, The Impact of Term Limitations on the
States: Cutting the Underbrushor ChoppingDown the Tall Timber?, in LIMrmNG LEGISLATIVE
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of these frustrations was a sense that "special interests" had become unduly influential
in the legislative process, while ordinary constituents were increasingly marginalized.
At both the state and national level, the term limits movement thus responded to
growing public concern about influence peddling in politics. As Professors Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey summarized it at the time, "[a] major argument in favor of
term limits is that campaign funding by interest groups tends to lock incumbents into
place, with the effect that legislators are less responsive to the public interest." 28 Or, as
President George H.W. Bush more popularly explained in his 1991 State of the Union
Address, "[O]ne of the reasons.., there is so much support across this country for
term limitations is that the American people are increasingly concerned about bigmoney influence in politics." 29 Many others were making similar arguments, including
the claim that term limits would produce "citizen legislators" less corrupted by the
impact of money in politics, more representative of their constituents, and more
responsive to the concerns of ordinary voters.30
Of course, similar concern about the influence of money in politics has been the
primary motivating force behind the modem campaign finance reform movement, a
movement that typically traces its contemporary roots to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent revision in light of the events of Watergate. 3
As in the term limits context, this concern also is often articulated in two different but
related ways, one that focuses on perceived corruption in the political process, and the
32
other that focuses on perceived inequalities in political participation and power.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court relied in part on this distinction in its landmark
Buckley v. Valeo 33 decision invalidating portions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act. The Court viewed government efforts to preclude corruption or the appearance of
corruption as a legitimate basis for some restrictions on free speech rights, but saw
efforts to equalize citizens'34 ability to contribute to political debate as "wholly foreign
to the First Amendment."
Thus, a generalized concern about the potential corrupting and distributional
effects of money in politics underlies both the modem campaign finance and term

TERMS 189, 191-94 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).
28. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J. 457, 463-64 (1992).
29. President George H. W. Bush, State of the Union Address (1991), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENT 77 (1991).
30. See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION 56-57 (1992); Richard Cohen, It's Time to
Limit Terms, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1990, at A23.
31. See FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 1-9 (1992).
32. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption,Equality, & Campaign FinanceReform, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1369 (1994). Alternative formulations of reasons to regulate campaign
contributions and expenditures include: to insure competitiveness; to foster debate; to instill
public confidence; and to free candidates from excessive pressures to raise funds. See Jamin
Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1160 (1994); Vincent Blasi, Free
Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not
Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1281 (1994).
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
34. Id. at 49. However, the distinction between these two types of distorting effects of
money in politics may not always be so easy to maintain. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 32, at

1370 (arguing that concern about corruption in campaign finance in fact is a derivative concern
about inequality).
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limits movements.35 It therefore is worth noting that, despite a common popular
perception that both the power and corruption of special interests have risen
substantially in recent decades,36 neither the term limits movement nor the campaign
finance reform movement is at all new to American politics. Rather, the campaign
finance reform movement traces its origins at least to the time of Lincoln, 37 and the
term limits issue has been present in some form in the United States from the time of
the founding, with precedents in antiquity. 38 Nevertheless, as sketched briefly in the
following two sections, both issues independently garnered new-found popular support
in the waning years of the twentieth century.
B. The Campaign FinanceReform Movement
By the mid 1990s, a number of campaign finance reform efforts were underway at
the state level, even while national campaign finance reform efforts were essentially at
a standstill. 39 A fuller appreciation of the popular appeal of-and aspirations for-the
1990s term limits movement depends, in part, on an understanding of these various
recent campaign finance reform efforts, which
were heavily influenced by the Supreme
4
Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo. 0
Comprehensive efforts to regulate campaign spending only began to mature in the
1960s. 41 These efforts were driven largely by the rapid escalation in candidates' media

35. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Pox Populi: Why the New "Reform" Really Serves the
Elites, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1993, at C1.
36. See ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES 2-6 (2000).
37. According to some accounts, in an 1864 letter, President Lincoln wrote of his fear that,
notwithstanding a successful conclusion of the Civil War, another crisis threatened the Republic
in the form of monied interests' efforts to control government. The letter reportedly read that
"[a]s a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high
places will follow." See ARCHER H. SHAW, THE LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA 40 (1950). The
Abraham Lincoln Association disputes the authenticity of this letter, however. See Thomas F.
Schwartz, Lincoln Never Said That, 1 FOR THE PEOPLE 5-6 (1999), available at
http://www.alincolnassoc.com/newsletters/1-l .pdf. In any event, the first federal law regulating
campaign financing followed shortly thereafter in the form of an 1867 prohibition on soliciting

political contributions from certain naval employees, followed in turn by the 1883 Civil Service
Reform Act, which made it a crime for any federal employee to solicit campaign contributions
from any other employee. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, DOLLAR POLITICS 3 (3d ed. 1982).
Concerns about the impact of money in politics preceded the country's founding, however.
In 1757, George Washington was charged with distributing 160 gallons of alcoholic beverages
among the 391 voters in the district in which he was running for the Virginia House of
Burgesses. See id.
38. See Mark P. Petracca, A History of Rotation in Office, in LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS:
PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 247 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1996); Petracca, supranote 17, at 19;
Corwin, supra note 9, at 583-87.
39. See Malcolm E. Jewell & William E. Cassie, Can the Legislative CampaignFinance
System Be Reformed?, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 209 (Joel A.
Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds.,1998); MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY
AFTER REFORM 4-5 (1998).
40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent approval of the

constitutionality of most of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, see McConnell
v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), the Buckley decision continues to remain the defining feature of
the contemporary campaign finance landscape.
41. Although the Tillman Act of 1907 and the Smith-Connally Act of 1943 had banned
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expenditures that accompanied the advent of televised campaign advertising, the
weakening of political party influence, and the arrival of the candidate-centered
campaigns that now dominate American politics. 42 At the federal level, the result was
the heralded yet fairly weak Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which limited
certain expenditures and contributions, and called for limited financial disclosures
from candidates.43 Almost immediately thereafter, the Watergate crisis and its
accompanying campaign financing scandals 44 led to a complete reworking of the 1971
statute, in the form of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act.45
Also prompted by both Watergate and the rapidly rising costs of political
campaigns at the state and local levels, between 1972 and 1974 forty-nine states passed
some form of campaign finance measure, some with contribution and expenditure
limits, and many with meaningful disclosure requirements. 46 The primary result of
these measures was not any significant alteration of state campaign practices, however,
but merely heightened public awareness of "the predominant role of lobbies
and
47
special-interest groups in campaign funding, especially of legislative races.,
Then, in Buckley v. Valet, the Supreme Court dramatically altered the campaign
finance landscape by striking down on First Amendment grounds the provisions in the
1974 federal election law that limited the amounts that candidates (or their supporters
independently) could spend on political campaigns, while upholding the federal law's

political contributions to federal candidates from corporate and union treasuries, respectively,
these and other earlier twentieth-century federal reform efforts, such as the Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925 and the Hatch Act Amendments of 1940, were easily circumvented and lacked any
meaningful enforcement efforts. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 41-43; CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, supra note 37, at 6-7. As early as the 1890s and 1900s, some states had
experimented with stronger campaign finance reform measures, including expenditure
limitations and public funding, but by 1910 most of these early measures had either been
repealed or declared unconstitutional by state courts. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLrTCS,A
BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY IN POLITICS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE-AND

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

REFORM-IN THE UNITED STATES 14-15 (1995). Between 1910 and 1970, states occasionally
attempted some weaker types of campaign finance reforms, such as banning campaign

contributions from government employees, prohibiting corporate or union contributions to
candidates, and limiting the size of individual contributions to candidates. See DONALD A.
GROSS & ROBERT K. GOIDEL, THE STATES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 3-4 (2003).
42. See SORAUF, supra note 31, at 2-5; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 37, at 7-8.
43. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 431-55).
44. The revelation of these scandals was in no small part a result of the disclosure
requirements of the 1971 Act. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 37, at 10-12.
45. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974). These amendments not only limited to $1000 the amount that one individual could
contribute to a single candidate per election, but also limited the amount that candidates for

federal office could spend on their campaigns, both from their own personal funds as well as
from contributed funds. The amendments also limited contributions to and expenditures by
party committees; established a system for public funding of presidential elections; required
more extensive financial disclosures by candidate committees; and created the Federal Election
Commission to implement and enforce the provisions.
46. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 41, at 15.
47. David S. Broder, Epilogue: Assessing CampaignReform: Lessons for the Future, in
CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND REALITY IN THE STATES 307, 313 (Herbert E. Alexander ed.
1976); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 37, at 10 (describing failure of 1971
FECA disclosure requirements to meaningfully alter contribution patterns).
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limits on the amounts that supporters could contribute to candidates.4 s The resulting
regulatory framework, in which candidates seek to raise as much money as possible to
fund unlimited campaign spending, but must do so only with contributions limited in
amount, has frequently been described as bizarre, even perverse,49 and has been
blamed for creating "pervasive dependence on special-interest contributions."5" In the
decades following Buckley, very little changed in the federal law regulating campaign
finance until
enactment of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act
51
("BCRA,,).
A similar situation existed at the state level, given that the First Amendment
rationale underlying the Buckley decision was equally applicable to both federal and
state campaign finance laws. However, in Buckley's shadow, a number of states in the
1980s and 1990s continued to explore a variety of alternative campaign finance
regulations, such as restricting fundraising activities during legislative sessions,
limiting the portion of contributions that a candidate could raise outside the candidate's
electoral district, providing full public funding in some races, or tying the amount of
public funds given to one candidate to the amount of independent expenditures made
on behalf of the candidate's opponent. 52 In addition, the number of states with
contribution limits or disclosure requirements continued to grow. As of 1980, twentytwo states had imposed a ceiling on the amount an individual could contribute to a
given candidate, and most states had adopted laws requiring candidates to file reports
disclosing all contributions over a specified minimum. 53 By 1997, thirty-eight states
had imposed contribution ceilings, 54 while many state campaign finance laws had
grown increasingly complex in an effort to respond to the expanding variety of
political committees, campaign activities, and independent expenditures now spreading

48. 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976). At the time, the law prohibited individual donors from
contributing more than $1,000 per election to a given candidate. See id.
49. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 407-08 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in ConstitutionalLaw: The
Future of CampaignFinanceReform Laws in the Courtsand in Congress,27 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 665, 666 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1705, 1706 (1999).
50. COMMON CAUSE, In the States: Money in Politics, at http://www.commoncause.org
/states/money.htm. Similarly, the Center for Responsive Politics took the view that the resulting
system "only served to sanitize, rationalize, and legitimize the same old system of privatelyfinanced federal elections dominated by wealthy individuals and corporate contributors."
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLMCS, supra note 41, at 12.
51. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002). In part, the BCRA was an effort to respond to the fact that candidates, parties, and other
political interest groups had become increasingly sophisticated at raising and spending
astronomical sums, particularly through the use of "soft money," issue advertising, and
independent expenditures. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 45-46. At the same time, the
general public had become increasingly disillusioned by the apparent influence of special
interests, as represented by such events as the "Keating Five" scandal, etc. By 1996, the
resulting system of financing federal elections was called by many "a system in crisis." See, e.g.,
id. at 2, 4 ("To all appearances it looked as though the system of financing elections-at least at
the national level-had gone completely haywire in 1996.").
52. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 46; CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITCS, supra note
41, at 15-16.
53. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 13, 16.
54. See id. at 16, 19-20.
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to political campaigns at the state and local levels.55
Nevertheless, many observers, and the general public, remained quite discouraged
about campaign financing practices at the state level.56 Plaintiffs successfully
challenged a number of the more innovative state reforms in court as violating the
standards enunciated in Buckley,57 and several subsequent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions through the mid- 1990s also continued to frustrate reformers.5 As a result, in
1995, the Center for Responsive Politics could describe the situation as "still far from
promising," 59 despite what some experts described as the "greatest resurgence" in
efforts at state and local campaign finance reform since the Watergate era. 6° The term
limits movement arose in the midst of this environment.
C. The Advent of Legislative Term Limits
Although isolated movements to impose term limits had surfaced in a few states in
the 1980s, 61 1990 fairly marks the beginning of the contemporary term limits
movement. In that year, high-profile successes of ballot propositions in Oklahoma,
California, and Colorado placed the idea of legislative term limits squarely on the
national agenda. By 1995, twenty-one other states had followed suit.62 These proposals
attracted widespread popular support in part because of the disappointing results of

55. See id. at 21-22.
56. Some have called campaign finance regulation "an example of institutional failure."
See Garrett, supra note 49, at 665. Garrett justifiably blames this failure in large part on the
reluctance of legislators to pass reforms that would threaten their incumbency. See id. at 665 &
n.2. Of course, one salutary effect of legislative term limits, where they exist, ought to be a
significant reduction of this barrier to meaningful campaign finance reform.
57. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 47-48.
58. For instance, FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), held that

states could not regulate spending on referenda campaigns, FEC v. National Conservative
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), invalidated prohibitions on PAC independent
expenditures on behalf of candidates accepting public funding, and Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), invalidated the regulation of

political parties' independent expenditures. Meanwhile, lower federal court decisions
invalidated not only spending limits on local races, see Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d
907 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998), but also contribution limits deemed too low
to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, see Russell v. Burnis, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998).
59. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLrncs, supra note 41, at 17.
60. Frederick M. Hermann & Ronald D. Michaelson, FinancingState and LocalElections:
Recent Developments, in 30 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 227 (Council of State Governments ed.,

1994).
61. For example, in 1980-81 and again in 1988, Taxpayers United for Term Limits
unsuccessfully circulated petitions to get a term limits proposal on the ballot in Michigan. See
DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at 115-16. In 1985, U.S. Congressman Bill McCollum of
Florida and other House Republicans founded the Committee on Limiting Terms. A similar
group, Americans to Limit Congressional Terms, appeared on the scene in 1989. Previously,
term limits had taken effect in several cities as well. See id. (describing term limits measures
adopted in Philadelphia in 1951, El Paso in 1977, San Francisco and Wichita in 1988, and
Dallas, San Antonio, and Phoenix in 1989).
62. Eighteen of these states adopted term limits on members of their state legislatures, see
infra notes 83-85, while three additional states adopted term limits only on their members of
Congress, see infra note 63.
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campaign finance reform efforts. Congress was undeniably the principal target, but
almost every state that adopted congressional
term limits also limited the terms of their
63
state legislators, with three exceptions.
Oklahoma's state legislative term limit measure, adopted in September 1990 as a
constitutional initiative, 64 prohibited a person from serving more than twelve years in
the Oklahoma state senate, state house, or the two combined.65 Shortly thereafter, in
the November 1990 election, California and Colorado adopted their own constitutional
initiatives. 66 The text of California's ballot proposition explicitly declared that
incumbents had "unfair... advantages" that created "a class of career politicians,
67
instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers."
Proponents of term limits proclaimed that forcing representatives from office at
regular intervals would make campaigns more competitive and interesting, bringing in
fresh ideas and providing a more attractive selection of candidates.68 In turn, more
meaningful campaigns would enhance our civic dialogues and also lead to the election
of a more diverse group of representatives. The resulting broader dispersion of
legislative power among citizen legislators then would enable
the development of
69
"better" or more responsive and creative legislative solutions.
From this perspective, term limit proponents could fashion a response to the
argument that term limits are superfluous because ordinary elections already provide
voters the ability to refuse to reelect politicians with whom they are not satisfied in
favor of selecting more attentive and attuned representatives. Absent term limits, this

63. Alaska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota adopted only congressional term limits. See
ALASKA STAT. § 15.30 (Michie 2002); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 653:3-4 (1996); N.D. CENT.

CODE § 16.1-01-13.1 (1997).
64. In Oklahoma, a bipartisan coalition of term-limit proponents took advantage of a
climate of embarrassment surrounding the state legislature to place the issue before the
electorate at the primary run-off election held in September 1990. See Gary W. Copeland, Term
Limitationsand PoliticalCareersin Oklahoma:In, Out, Up, orDown, in LIMrriNG LEGISLAIVE
TERMS 139, 140-42 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992). Proponents persuaded

Oklahoma Governor Henry Bellmon to place the initiative on the September ballot in part so
that Oklahoma would beat out Colorado and California as the first state to limit legislative
terms. See John David Rausch, Jr. & Gary W. Copeland, Term Limits in Oklahoma, California,
and Colorado in 1990, in LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITs: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 199, 201

(Bernard Grofman ed., 1996).
65. See Copeland, supra note 64, at 141.
66. California's measure capped state Assembly service at six years and state senate service
at eight years, while Colorado's measure capped house and senate service at eight years each.
California's cap, like Oklahoma's, was a lifetime limit, while Colorado's was only a prohibition
on more than eight years of consecutive service, permitting individuals to serve again after a
four-year break. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 tbl. 1.1.
67. Prop. 140. This proposition became part of the California Constitution in 1990. CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.5.
68. See, e.g., DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at 132 ("[T]he new representatives will
belong to groups that so far were not able to gain equal representation."); Fund, supra note 17,
at 235 ("Term limits will encourage different people to run for office" and will increase
competition.); William Kristol, Term Limitations: Breaking Up the Iron Triangle, 16 HARV.
J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 95, 97 (1993).
69. See Corwin, supra note 9, at 603. Meanwhile, supporters also argued that term limits

would keep representatives closer to the people, once they were elected, and reduce
representatives' alignment with special interests. See Cohen & Spitzer, supranote 9, at 480-81;
Fund, supra note 17, at 236.
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response went, politically ambitious "career politicians" will continue to dominate
races for legislative seats,70 especially in professionalized legislatures. 7' In that
circumstance, the electorate's power to defeat one ambitious incumbent merely to
replace her with another does not provide a meaningful reform option to those who
desire not just different politicians but a different type of politician. Term limits thus
promised to reinvigorate the class of citizen-lawmakers by depriving professional
lawmakers (at least partially) of their ambition.72
Not surprisingly, however, predictions about the actual ability of term limits to
reform our legislative processes varied significantly. 73 Some opponents were skeptical
about the prospects for meaningful enhancement of diversity in electoral competition,
believing that term limited legislatures would continue to attract only a narrow elitist
group of citizens to political service.74 Indeed, they queried whether term limits would
further narrow this group, discouraging from elected office those for whom the idea of
abandoning their present occupation for a transitory stint in public service was an
unaffordable luxury.75 Others feared that absent more fundamental changes in other
aspects of our political system, the campaign processes by which we elect legislators
would continue to reward the same kinds of candidates, despite the presence of term
limits. 76 As one observer put it, "We will still have media-dominated campaigns, weak
party organizations, and candidates who are77forced to rely on their own skills in selling
their personal attributes to the electorate.,

70. See Cleta D. Mitchell, Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental
Democracy, 7 J.L. & POL. 733, 739 (1991).

71. The greater the level of professionalization within the legislature, the more attractive it
typically will be to ambitious politicians. See Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief, Exploring
the "Lost World" of Campaign Finance, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
ELECTIONS 10 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds., 1998).

72. Another, more common, response is that election processes unduly favor career
politicians, who as a result, become insufficiently accountable. In the words of term-limits
advocate George F. Will, "Term limits regulate competition in order to intensify it .... George
F. Will, Term Limits: Antitrust in Politics,WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at C7.
73. For a representative sampling of pros and cons, see the materials collected in Appendix
A to LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS, supra note 27, at 223 app. This discrepancy of views not
only existed between proponents and opponents of term limits, but also was particularly acute
between many professional observers, on one hand, and the majority of the general public, on
the other. As Bruce Cain and Mark Levin recently expressed in reviewing many of these
predictions, "[alside from perhaps campaign finance reform, no other reform has produced as
wide a discrepancy between public and professional political science opinion as has term
limits." Cain & Levin, supra note 21, at 166. In contrast to the strong majority of the public,
who have supported term limits almost everywhere they have had the chance to vote on them,
the political science community has generally been pessimistic about the potential for term
limits to improve our legislative processes. See id.; DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at xxixxiii; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 84-85 & n.5. Term limits have not been without some support
among the academic community, however. See Petracca, supranote 17, at 42-43; Elhauge et al.,
supra note 20.
74. See Broder, supra note 35. For a thoughtful and systematic argument that congressional
term limits would do little to alter the career ambitions of members of Congress, see Garrett,
supra note 9.
75. See Garrett, supra note 9.
76. Or, as one politician put it, "They will have the same suit of clothes with a different
face." Most LegislatorsSaying "No" to Term Limits, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 5, 1991, at C3.
77. Linda L. Fowler, A Comment on Competition and Careers,in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE

2004]

TERM LIMITS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Opponents also argued that even if term limits resulted in the election of fresh
faces more broadly representative of and in touch with constituents, any such modemday Cincinnatus was not likely to be effective in today's political environment. For
instance, many feared that term-limited legislators in fact might be less responsive to
their constituents, especially in their final term (throughout the entirety of which they
would be lame-ducks). 78 Some also argued that, under term limits, representatives
might be less responsive to their constituents in earlier terms as well because of heavy
pressures to advance a short-term agenda over a long-term one. 79 Other term-limit
opponents predicted that the loss of institutional expertise among elected
representatives flowing from the influx of many citizen legislators would lead to the
redistribution of power to staff, executive branch officials, 80and lobbyists, who are
much less accountable participants in the legislative process.
Nevertheless, term limits proposals generally attracted wide popular support,
typically over the opposition of state legislators themselves. The Colorado and
81
Oklahoma provisions of 1990 passed by 71 percent and 67 percent, respectively.
Meanwhile, although California's 1990 proposition was approved by only 52 percent
of the voters, this proposition was the more
severe of two term-limit provisions
82
simultaneously before the California voters.
Two years later, ballot initiatives imposing some form of term limits on state
legislators passed in twelve more states, receiving an average level of support in excess
of 66 percent. 83 In part, these successes were the result of a nationwide campaign
coordinated by the group U.S. Term Limits, especially over the summer and fall of
1992. 84 Maine came on board in the 1993 election, followed by Idaho, Massachusetts,
Nevada, and Utah in 1994, and Louisiana in 1995.85
The popular initiative provided the vehicle for the adoption of legislative term
limits in every state but Utah, where the state legislature enacted a statutory term limit
TERMS 181, 181-82 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).
78. Indeed, some opined that term-limited legislators might begin to lose focus on their
legislative work even in their penultimate terms or earlier, as they started looking ahead to their
next job, angling for a soft landing post-term. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 9, at 482.
79. See id. at 492-95.
80. See id. at 482 (contending that term limits "waste talent and experience").
81. See DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at 76.
82. See Charles M. Price, The Guillotine Comes to California:Term-Limit Politicsin the
Golden State, in LIMrING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 117, 119-21 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J.

Malbin eds., 1992).
83. These twelve states (and their percentage of voters supporting term limits) were
Arizona (74%), Arkansas (60%), Florida (77%), Michigan (59%), Missouri (75%), Montana
(67%), Nebraska (68), Ohio (68%), Oregon (70%), South Dakota (64%), Washington (52%),
and Wyoming (77%). See DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at 82 tbl.4.2.
84. U.S. Term Limits, the most prominent national group supporting legislative term limits,
was organized in April 1992 as a reincarnated version of Citizens for Congressional Reform. In
1993, it also took over the group Americans to Limit Congressional Terms. See Alan E.
Peterson, Term Limits: The Law Review Article, Not the Movie, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 767,780

(1998).
85. See DORON & HARRIS, supra note 17, at 82 tbl.4.2. Citizens in Mississippi and North
Dakota rejected term limits measures. See National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"),
Frequently Asked Questions about Term Limits, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs

flegman/about/TLFAQ.htm. An earlier attempt failed in Washington, before a subsequent
provision there passed. See John D. Rausch, Jr., Understandingthe Term Limits Movement, in
THE TEST OF TIME 225, 228 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2003).
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to stave off an initiative effort,86 and Louisiana, which lacks the initiative process.87
Most of the popular initiatives were constitutional amendments, with the exceptions of
five states-Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington-where the
initiative process was used to enact a statutory term limits measure. In three of these
states-Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington---courts quickly threw out the
statutory measures as unconstitutional, 8 although Nebraska has subsequently
readopted a term limits provision by constitutional amendment. 89 More recently, the
Oregon Supreme Court invalidated its term limits measure on the technicality that,
although itself a constitutional amendment, the measure had been adopted in violation
of the state constitution's single subject rule. 9° In 2002 and 2003, the state legislatures
in Idaho and Utah repealed their statutory measures, 9' leaving sixteen states today with
legislative term limits.
Several important substantive differences exist among the sixteen extant state
legislative term-limits measures adopted between 1990 and 1995. In particular,
although a few states set their term limits as low as six years, the typical provision
precluded legislators from serving more than eight years, while several states adopted
twelve-year limits. 92 Meanwhile, some states imposed a lifetime ban on serving in the
state legislature once an individual had filled the specified number of terms, while
other states only prohibited an individual from serving more than a certain number of
consecutive terms. 9 3 In most states with consecutive-years limits, the term-limits period
applied independently to each house of the legislature, permitting legislators to remain
in office indefinitely if they moved back and forth between chambers,
while
94
Oklahoma's lifetime limit applied to combined service in either house.
Notwithstanding these variations, the popular appeal of all term limits measures
was in important respects a response to disappointments with efforts to regulate
campaign financing. For instance, Cleta Mitchell, a former member of the Oklahoma
House of Representatives and term-limits activist, 95 claimed that term limits would

86. See Term Limits Act, 1994 Utah Laws 264 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-10201 (repealed 2003)).
87. See 1995 La. Acts 1326 (legislative measure placing constitutional amendment on term
limits before general electorate); NCSL, supra note 85.
88. See League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 681 N.E.2d 842, 847
(Mass. 1997); Duggan v. Beerman, 544 N.W.2d 68, 82 (Neb. 1996); Gerberding v. Munro, 949
P.2d 1366, 1377 (Wash. 1998).
89. See NEB. CONST. art. 11, § 12.
90. OR. CONST. art. IH,§ 19 (invalidated by Lehman v. Bradbury, 37 P.3d 989 (Or. 2002)).
91. See Idaho H.B. 425 (2002); Michael Janofsky, IdahoLegislatureRepeals Term Limit
Law, Undoing Voter-Approved Measure, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2002, at All; Utah S.B. 240
(2003); Bob Bernick Jr., Term Limits Get the Boot, DESERET NEws, Mar. 6, 2003, at A26.
92. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4-5 tbl.l.1. The shorter periods tend to apply to
more professionalized legislatures. Some of the longer limits, in fact, were longer than the
average time members had been staying in office anyway. See DORON & HARRIS, supranote 17,
at 76, 81; Cindy Simon Rosenthal, How Long is Long Enough?, STATE LEGISLATURES, Oct.
1990, at 27, 27.
93. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 tbl. 1.1.
94. See id.
95. Mitchell helped spearhead the Oklahoma term limits initiative before going on to serve
as an advocate on behalf of term limits in other states and a board member of Americans to
Limit Congressional Terms. In the month following the Oklahoma success, Mitchell published
an Op-Ed supporting term limits in the Wall Street Journal, see Cleta D. Mitchell, InsiderTales
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"neutralize the power of special interests to control the nation's agenda with their
purchasing power." 96 Similarly, a 1991 newspaper account described polls showing
is for 'sale' to campaign contributors
that "the public's growing belief that government
97
is fueling support for term limitation laws."
Campaign contribution limits in the absence of campaign expenditure limits, as
constrained by the holding of Buckley v. Valeo, are generally seen as favoring
incumbents. 98 These and other advantages of incumbency only become more
99
pronounced as campaigns become more sophisticated and expensive.
Understandably, the notion that incumbents were becoming increasingly secure was
antithetic to ideals of representative democracy: "[I]f incumbents are almost always
reelected because they can raise'lmuch more money than challengers, accountability
may be more myth than reality."'
In this context, term limits were seized upon as a silver bullet to rescue the ideal of
representative democracy from the clutches of special interests. As George F. Will, one
of the best-known advocates of congressional term limits, put it: "In fact, term
limitation is a campaign-finance reform" because it will force PACs to redistribute
'0
short, term limits
their funds to "numerous competitive races for open seats."
' 2 ' In
reform."
finance
served as a sort of "poor man's campaign
of an HonorableEx-Legislator,WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1990, at A14, and in 1992 filed a Florida
court brief on behalf of the Term Limits Legal Institute, see LIMrriNG LEGISLATIVE TERMS, supra
note 27, at 251-61 app. (collecting excerpts from Florida court proceedings).
96. Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, Limit Terms? Yes!, ExTENsIONs 3, 5 (Spring 1991).
97. Tim Miller, Lots of Smoke, Little Fire on Campaign FinanceFront,DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 28, 1991, at 3B.
98. See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1127, 1131-33 (1994).
Much political science literature is also of this view. See Kermit Daniel & John R. Lott, Jr.,
Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from California's State Legislative
Races, 90 PUBLIC CHOICE 165, 171 (1997). Of course, incumbents already enjoy almost
insurmountable advantages, in the forms of access to funds, access to media, widespread name
recognition, the power of seniority, the ability to perform casework, and frequent public
appearances (and especially in Congress, such additional advantages as franking privileges,
extensive staff assistance, frequent travel opportunities, multiple public offices, and access to
recording studios). See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 9, at 479-80; Corwin, supra note 9, at 57576; Jonathan E. Kaplan, How Do You Lose a House Seat?, THE HILL, June 17, 2003, at 6.
99. By some accounts, overall campaign spending for congressional seats has increased
ten-fold since 1976, or more than three-fold after accounting for inflation. Compare SORAUF,
supra note 31, at 158 (stating that 1976 congressional election spending was $99 million), with
FEC Reports on Congressional Financial Activity for 2000, available at
(showing 1999-2000
http://www.fec.gov/press/051501congfinact/051501congfinact.html
congressional spending of just over one billion dollars). Although the increase has been less
striking in states, with significant state-to-state variations, the public perception has remained
that campaign spending even in state legislative races also has been constantly and rapidly
increasing. See Moncrief, supra note 24, at 38-39. Of course, in addition to inflation, another
factor responsible for increasing campaign costs is the growing population, as candidates must
reach larger and larger groups of potential voters. See id. Yet even accounting for population
growth, campaign costs have been rising rapidly. See id.
100. Jewell & Cassie, supra note 39, at 210.
101. George F. Will, Sort ofa Tantrum, CLEVELANDPLAIN DEALER, Nov. 12, 1992, at7B;
see Patrick Basham, Assessing the Term Limits Experiment: Californiaand Beyond, 413 POLICY
ANALYSIS 16 (Aug. 2001).
102. I am indebted to my colleague Ned Foley for this expression.
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The success of the term limits movement did not displace the debate over
campaign finance reform, however. In fact, the campaign finance reform and term
limits movements remained essentially independent efforts, despite their related
justifications. In part, this may have reflected the fact that some twenty-nine states did
not adopt state legislative term limits. In addition, the Supreme Court's rapid
invalidation of congressional term limits in 1995103 quickly eliminated term limits'
reform potential at the federal level. But undoubtedly a major reason that the two
movements remained quite distinct was because of strong objections to term limits
among staunch supporters of campaign finance reform. 104
These objections resulted not
only from philosophical opposition to term limits, but also from competing negative
visions of the actual impact of term limits. The next section reviews more specifically
several contrasting predictions about the ability of term limits to soften the influence of
special interests on politics and campaigning.
D. Conflicting PredictionsAbout Campaign Costsfor Term-Limited Seats
Most observers agreed that term limits would increase competition for legislative
seats. 105 Indeed, that was one of the central purposes of term limits. But not all agreed
on the impact that this competition would have on the costs and financing of legislative
campaigns. Although competition typically can be expected to increase both campaign
costs and the scramble for financial support, 106 many term limits advocates shared the
hope that term limits would "remove the grip that vested interests have over the
legislature and remove
the huge political slush funds at the disposal of senate and
10 7
assembly leaders."'
Specifically, some proponents argued that campaign costs would go down under
term limits as a result of both the decreased value of each legislative seat, and the
increased supply of open seats.108 To support this prediction, they employed a rent-

103. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
104. Campaign finance reform has typically generated its widest following among liberals,
some of whom objected to term limits because of a contrary view of good government and
others of whom saw term limits as a conservative power grab. Cf Daniel Friedman & Donald
Wittman, Term Limits as PoliticalRedistribution,in LEGISLATIvE TERM LIMrrs: PuBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVES

229, 236 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1996) (explaining that Republicans favor term

limits more than Democrats ); David J. Olson, Term Limits Fail in Washington: The 1991
Battleground,in LIMNING LEGISLATIVE TERMs 65, 76 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin

eds., 1992) (describing League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and environmental groups
as opposed to term limits on "good government" basis, and including organized labor and
Democratic party among term limit opponents). Accordingly, some commentators suggested
that campaign finance reform was a preferable response to perceived weaknesses in
representative democracy. See Corwin, supra note 9, at 600-07; Friedman & Wittman, supra.
105. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. But see Fowler, supranote 77, at 18283 (predicting that term limits would not increase competition but give political gatekeepers
even more control over candidate selection).
106. See Moncrief, supra note 24, at 45-46.
107. The CaliforniaBallot Pamphlet:The Prosand Cons of Proposition140, in LIMrrNG
LEGISLATIVE TERMS 276 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).
108. See CAREY ET AL., supranote 10, at 19; Mitchell, supra note 96, at 4-5 (arguing that

term limits would improve upon existing system of "expensive, PAC-funded" elections and free
amateur politicians from need to become "expert[s] at raising money"); see also Elhauge et al.,
supra note 20, at 68-69 (predicting term limits will reduce assets needed to challenge
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seeking model to predict that seats in a term-limited legislature would have less value
to potential occupants, and that candidates-and their supporters--therefore would not
be willing to invest as much to capture or retain them, even if facing more
competition. 109 Alternatively, scarcity theory might also suggest that open seats would
have more value when there are fewer of them, at least to interest groups that have the
ability to target races selectively, and so that as the annual supply of open seats
0
increases under term limits, any one seat will on average become less attractive.' 1
One frequently cited study of campaign expenses for the California legislature for
the ten elections between 1976 and 1994 provided early reinforcement for those who
claimed that term limits would reduce campaign expenditures. Of course, because
California's term limits provision did not become effective until 1996, this study
predated any direct impact of term limits on campaign financing. Instead, the authors
sought to test their hypothesis that the anticipatoryeffects of term limits from the time
of their enactment in 1990 would already "effectively act as a tax on campaign
expenditures because the politicians' specific investments would be lost when the term
limit becomes binding ....

,111
This study concluded that the presence of term limits

reduced overall campaign costs, finding that "campaign expenditures for the three
general elections from 1984 to 1988 averaged $309,144 [in 1982 dollars], or 44
[1990, 1992, and
percent higher than the $215,019 spent on the three general elections
' 12
1994] that took place after the term limits initiative passed." "
On the other hand, for some prognosticators, the likelihood of increased
competition for seats in term-limited legislatures led to predictions that campaign
expenses would rise once term limits took effect, particularly in primary elections for
"open" seats (those seats for which no incumbent was running)." 3 In these contests,
candidates may need to build an image from scratch, and often may face this task
without yet having the support of their party. This can be an expensive undertaking. If
incumbents).
109. See, e.g., Patrick Basham, Term Limits Lessonsfor CampaignReform, Cato Institute,
availableathttp://www.cato.org/dailys/08-31-01.html, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2001) ("Term Limits act
as a natural campaign finance reform."); CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 36 (describing term
limits proponents' claims that "term limits will diminish campaign spending by reducing the
value of incumbency both to officeholders and to contributors"); Daniel & Lott, supra note 98,
at 165, 167 (making similar argument); Elhauge, supra note 5, at 169 & n.309 ("The shorter
expected tenure means they had incentives to spend less in either defending a seat or
challenging an incumbent. As term limits kick in fully, spending should decrease further
because with less senior incumbents the brand name advantage needed to be overcome with
campaign advertising will decline.").
110. Individual candidates of course may not care how many total open seats there are, but

only whether the seat in their particular district is open.
111. Daniel & Lott, supra note 98, at 167-68.
112. Id.at 174. Professors Carey, Niemi, & Powell have critiqued Daniel & Lott's
"dubious conclusions," arguing that they attribute all their findings to the anticipatory effects of
term limits in 1990, 1992, and 1994, without accounting for such other possible factors as
nationwide anti-incumbency sentiment. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 36-37. "Daniel &
Lott's results are a product of their limited data and questionable specification of term-limit

effects." Id. at 37. (Carey, Niemi, & Powell also have tested other portions of the same Daniel &
Lott study, specifically whether term limits also affect incumbents' reelection probabilities, and
did not find any term limits effect, contrary to Daniel & Lott.).
113. See Dalene Allebaugh & Neil Pinney, The Real Cost of Term Limits: Comparative
Study of Competition and Electoral Costs, in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE
TERM LIMrrs 161, 161 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2003).
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so, then term limits "may increase the importance of money in elections because of the
reduced effect of incumbency: there will be more open-seat contests, for which money
is more important ....
,114
Furthermore, at least for some candidates, it simply may be easier to raise more
money when competing for an open seat than it would be when challenging an
incumbent. Many candidates may also be able to take advantage of having more time
to anticipate and plan for their campaign, 15 grooming supporters and building fund
raising capabilities, in light of their certain knowledge that a seat will be open by a
particular date, with the result being a much deeper campaign war chest. Additionally,
term-limits-era races for seats in a state legislature's upper chamber may more often
involve seasoned politicians seeking to move on from the lower house, bringing with
them the ability to raise large amounts of campaign cash, if not also sizable cash
reserves remaining from previous campaigns.
Thus, some predicted that term limits would do little to alter the influence of
special interests on campaigns and elections. 116 In fact, some lobbyists explicitly
anticipated playing a much greater role both in campaigns for open seats and in
candidate recruitment efforts.1 17 Obviously, to the extent that interest group
representatives acted consistently with these intentions, the likely result would be
increased special interest influence in state legislatures, unless other countervailing
factors (such as the election of candidates who refused any PAC or bundled
contributions) frustrated these interest group activities.
Of course, all of these concerns about, and aspirations for, legislative term limits
were merely speculations, subject to the difficulties of anticipating the results of a
complicated social system, as well as the inherent unpredictability of politics. Today,
however, we no longer need merely guess about the impact of term limits, but can
begin to assess their actual effects.
ff. THE ACTUAL IMPACT OF TERM LIMITS

ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND MEMBER

CHARACTERISTICS

Today, more than half of the states with legislative term limits have seen the limits

114. Anthony Gierzynski, A Frameworkfor the Study of CampaignFinance,in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 18, 23 (Joel A. Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief eds.,

1998); see CAREY Er AL., supra note 10, at 36-39 (predicting higher costs).

115. See, e.g., Daniel & Lott, supra note 98, at 169 ("Making the date that incumbents
must leave office by more certain (through term limits), may encourage challengers to enter into
races before the seat actually becomes vacant."); MONCRIEFETAL., supra note 19, at 26 (quoting
state legislative candidate who supported term limits because "[pleople like me can anticipate an
open seat and prepare").
116. See, e.g., Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, How Prop. 140 Could Feed the Public'sDistrustof
Government, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1991, at M5 (warning that term limits may increase special
interest influence in electing representatives); Dana Parsons, FinanceReform is One Sure Way
to Keep the Bums Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1992, at B 1 (arguing special interests will continue
to dominate state legislative elections under term limits).
117. See Paul Jacobs, Lobbyists Get a LargerRole in Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1991, at A3. Of course, many others also predicted that beyond the campaign context, special
interests would in general have more, not less, influence over term-limited legislators. See, e.g.,
Norman J. Ornstein, Term Limits Would JustMake Things Worse, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1991,
at C7.
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they adopted in the early 1990s force out the entire body of legislators elected in the
pre-term limits era. Accordingly, opportunities exist to test a variety of predictions,
including those summarized in Part I above. The first section of this Part presents two
previous studies from California and Michigan, prefaced with first-hand observations
that begin to assess predictions about the impact of term limits on the financing of
campaigns for seats in term-limited legislatures.
The second section builds on these reports by presenting a preliminary study of
the effect of term limits on the financing of legislative campaigns in Ohio. This study
examines changes to the competitiveness of state legislative races, as well as to the
patterns of expenditures and contributions in these races. The Ohio study reinforces the
California and Michigan accounts, suggesting that existing campaign structures
continue to favor politicians with strong financial support, with competition
increasingly shifting to primary races. In addition, the Ohio study finds some
interesting changes after term limits took effect in expenditures and contributions
across political parties, and in the timing of contributions.
The third section of this Part then reviews a number of studies addressing whether
a different type of legislator is capturing seats in term limited legislatures. These
studies show little change in the characteristics of elected representatives, or in the
composition of term-limited legislatures (other than a decrease in political experience).
Of course, given the continued high cost of campaigning, this is not such a surprising
result." 8 If this pattern continues over the longer haul, however, it would seem that
term limits are not likely to infuse our political campaigns with the promised vitality,
independence, and creativity upon which the term limits movement was heavily
predicated. 9
A. CampaignFinancingfor Seats in Term-Limited Legislatures
Whether the typical legislator elected under term limits fits the profile of a "citizen
legislator," or instead essentially conforms to the profile of a "professional" member,
we might still see meaningful differences in the expenditures now required to capture
seats in term-limited legislatures. This section first presents observations about the
nature of campaign financing in a term-limited environment from individuals directly
involved in seeking state legislative office. It then describes data from California and
Michigan as a prelude to the next section's more extensive study of Ohio legislative
races. The data must be interpreted cautiously because of the many factors that may
affect the costs of legislative elections. Accordingly, all the studies are better
understood in conjunction with the perceptions and explanations of those directly
involved in the campaigns.
1. First-Person Reports of the Impact of Term Limits on Legislative Campaigns
Both academic researchers and the press have reported the first-hand accounts of a

118. One related inquiry worthy of further study is whether term limits are encouraging the
entry of a different type of unsuccessful candidate, who simply remains unable to crack the
barriers created by those who control access to political money.
119. Some were predicting this result long before it began to occur. See, e.g., Fowler,
supra note 77, at 181-85; David S. Broder, The Mirage of Term Limits, WASH. POST, June 13,
1990, at A23.
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number of state legislators, candidates, lobbyists, and others of the impact of
legislative term limits on a variety of subjects. With respect to the issue of whether
campaigning has changed, these direct observers have described an increased scramble
for campaign money, a longer campaign cycle for open seat elections, and a reduction
in competition against incumbents, especially in an incumbent's later terms. 2 °
With respect to the direct effects of term limits on campaign financing, a number
of state legislators and other participants in state legislative elections have described
their sense that in the term limits era, the demand for campaign funds has increased.
For instance, Professors Carey, Niemi, and Powell reported that state legislators
interviewed in both Maine and California perceived that "the demand for money
increases as a result of term limits.' 21 More recently, term limits were described as a
factor that contributed to22 record campaign expenditures in the 2002 elections in
Colorado and Michigan.1
An increase in the number of open seats may partially explain this. As one postterm limits legislative leader explained, campaigns for open seats are "among the most
expensive legislative races to win."' 123 But campaigns for open seats also may be
contested even more vigorously now. 124 Indeed, after term limits had taken effect in
California in 1996, the director of California Common Cause reported that for the first
time "political candidates are holding fundraisers in Sacramento-which means that
' 25
they're shaking down the special interests-even before they're elected."'
Accordingly, some lobbyists and other professional political observers have expressed
such sentiments as "[w]e are about to reach a point where
the candidate pool will
'' 26
dramatically shrink because of the cost of campaigning.
Another explanation for higher campaign expenses under term limits is that
incumbents now feel pressure to begin preparing to run for a higher office much
earlier, and therefore use their state legislative office as a platform to raise money for
even more expensive races.12 7 In turn, these large war chests may discourage
challengers from taking on incumbents, 28 just as they have in non-term-limited

120. Legislators as a class have a negative opinion towards term limits, however, creating a
potential bias in their assessment of the impact of term limits on their campaigns. See
PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE
LEGISLATORS SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 2, 8 (2003) available at http://

www.stateline.org/specialreport/Pew%20State%20Legislators%20%238288.pdf (reporting 2003
survey showing 79% of state legislators had unfavorable view of term limits); National
Conference of State Legislatures, Survey Results: NCSL's Online Term Limits Poll, at

http://www.ncsl.org/programslegman/about/survrslt.htm (last updated July 18,2003) (reporting
2000 survey showing 83% of state legislators had unfavorable view of term limits).
121. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 38.
122. See Burt Hubbard, Election Funding Sets New Records, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
(Denver), Dec. 26, 2002, at A4; Tim Martin, CampaignsPricierAfterTerm Limits, Study Finds,
LANSING STATE J., Oct. 27, 2002, at A9.
123. Larry Householder, Term Limits and a Modelfor Governance,SPECTRUM, Fall 2001,

at 31.
124. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 36, 39.
125. Peter Schrag, The PopulistRoad to Hell, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1996, at 24, 27.
126. William K. Weisenberg, The Curse of Term Limits, OHIO LAW., July/Aug. 2003, at 24,
34.
127. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 38; James M. Penning, Michigan: The End is
Near, in THE TEST OF TIME 33, 42 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2003).
128. See Peter Luke & Ed Golder, Term Limits Fail to Halt Flow of PAC Cash, GRAND
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elections. 129 But for other reasons as well, term limited incumbents may feel more
secure. For instance, incumbent state legislators in Maine described a perceptible
decrease in the willingness of challengers to take them on in later terms after the onset
of term limits. 30 They explained that once incumbents are heading into their final term
or two,3 "most people are willing to wait them out," rather than trying to run against
them.' 1
Party officials have also described a new campaign dynamic in which many more
potential candidates for open seats are making their intentions known as early as
eighteen months before the election, giving the party a whole new role in winnowing
the field.132 One county party organization described a screening process beginning in
July of the off-year, designed to lead to a party endorsement by the December prior to
the primary election, whereafter the party would be willing to spend party funds in
support of that candidate's primary election, if necessary.' 33 Legislative caucus leaders
in candidate recruiting and primary election
also describe becoming more involved
34
contests in response to term limits.
To examine the validity of these informed but still anecdotal reports from the front
lines, we next consider the findings of several more comprehensive analyses. These
studies begin to offer a more systematic analysis of the relationships between term
limits and campaign finance. As the first investigations of this phenomenon, however,
they warrant at least two cautions. First, each state's unique political culture and
35
institutional structure make comparisons of absolute costs across states problematic.'
Accordingly, analyses of term limits so far focus on changes within one or two states.
Comparing experiences across states will require additional time, data collection, and
controls for differences among states.
Second, it is important to note that the period of these studies was a period of
rising campaign costs generally, independent of term limits. Much of this increase was
the result of greater sophistication in the conduct of political campaigns, coupled with
the spread of this sophistication to state and local races from its breeding ground in
national and federal elections. 136 For instance, one recent study of campaign tactics in
electoral districts with fewer than 250,000 residents found many of the most
sophisticated types of campaign strategies and tools in wide use even in these smaller
districts by the later 1990s. 137 These developments make it harder to test conclusively
May 3, 1998, at A21 (quoting one incumbent's belief that a large campaign
treasury "will make somebody think twice if they try and run against you").
129. See Robert E. Hogan, Campaign War Chests and ChallengerEmergence in State
Legislative Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 815, 815 (2001).
RAPIDS FREE PRESS,

130. CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 37.

131. Id.
132. See Howard Wilkinson, Term Limits Start a CandidateFlood,CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
July 7, 1999, at IA.
133. See id.
134. See Householder, supra note 123, at 31.
135. For instance, the extent to which a state's legislature is professional or amateur will
likely affect the amount expended by most candidates. The size of districts is another factor that
directly affects expenses, and which varies widely from state to state. Aside from a multitude of
other demographic factors, campaign finance laws in each state also vary widely and affect
typical expenditures. Thus, many questions remain for further study, and the area is ripe for the
application of multivariate analyses, in addition to the preliminary inquiries reported herein.
136. See J. CHERIE STRACHAN, HIGH-TECH GRASS ROOTS: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
LOCAL ELEcTIONs 2-6 (2003).
137. Id. at 24. In many cases, political candidates in more localized races have begun
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for a connection between term limits and campaign costs. More conclusive tests will
have to await the collection of data over more years.
2. Previous Studies in California and Michigan
At least two previous studies have found increases in campaign contributions and
expenditures in the first election after state legislative term limits take effect. As part of
an ongoing effort to track the role of money in politics, Common Cause of California
reported large increases in campaign contributions to candidates for the California
legislature in 1996, the year term limits first precluded incumbents from seeking
reelection to the California legislature. In 1998, two Michigan researchers, in a study
focusing on the impact of legislative term limits, similarly found significant increases
in candidate expenditures in primary races for open seats in the Michigan House of
Representatives.
California 1996. In an analysis of campaign contributions in races for the
California state legislature in 1996, Common Cause of California described as
"phenomenal" the amount of fundraising that occurred in the first election cycle after
term limits took effect in California. 138 While the $89 million raised by candidates in
the previous election of 1993-94 had itself set a record, the post-term limits election
season of 1995-96 saw a 37% increase over this prior record, to $122 million. 139 On
the senate side, the increase seems attributable in part to the number of term-limited
assembly members who sought election to the state senate that year, bringing with
them their seasoned fund-raising and campaigning abilities.14 Indeed, Common Cause
reported that an incumbent member of the California Assembly was running in every
open race for a seat in the California Senate in 1996. 141 In the most expensive of these
races, the candidates raised over four million dollars, twice the amount raised in the
most expensive California Senate race in 1994.142 Across all California Senate seats,
43
the average amount raised increased 20% between the 1994 and 1996 elections. 1
The increases were even larger in races for the California Assembly. There, openseat candidates raised a total of $24 million in 1996, in contrast with $13 million in

employing these much more sophisticated techniques not so much out of necessity as out of a
sense that this is now how serious politicians are expected to campaign. See id. at 38-39.
138. See http://www.commoncause.org/states/califomia/archives/lastwaltz%2dl996fund
raising/intro.html, at 2.
139. See http://www.commoncause.org/states/califomia/archives/lastwaltz%2dl996fund
raising/ex-summary.htnl#recipients. Figures are rounded to the nearest million dollars.
140. See Max Vanzi & Cathleen Decker, Candidates'Last-Minute FilingsShow Frantic
Shuffle Forcedby Term Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1995, at A3 (reporting that eleven termedout Assembly members filed to run for state senate); cf. CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 127
(explaining that term-limited members of lower house are more likely than non-term-limited
counterparts to aspire to office in higher chamber, especially in more professionalized
legislatures); Clucas, supra note 23, at 23.
141. See http://www.commoncause.org/states/california/archives/lastwaltz%2d 1996fundr
aisinglrecipients2.html.
142. See http://www.commoncause.orgstates/califormiaarchives/lastwaltz%2dl996fundr
aising/ex-summary.html.
143. See http://www.conmoncause.org/states/califonia/archives/lastwaltz%2dl996ftndr
aising/recipients2.html. The Common Cause study did not report the average increase for open
senate seats, only for all senate seats, but did explain that open seats accounted for 82% of total
senate fundraising in 1996. See id.
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1994.144 On a per-seat basis, the average amount raised for each open seat increased
44% between 1994 and 1996, from $577,000 to $83 1,000.141 While in 1994 three

California Assembly open seat races had exceeded $1 million in fundraising, in 1996
146
six races exceeded this threshold, and three of these actually exceeded $2 million.
These figures alone cannot conclusively link term limits to increases in campaign
contributions. Still, the figures challenge the earlier conclusions of Daniel and Lott,
based on data through the 1994 election, that expenditures (rather than contributions)
for races in the California legislature began falling with the adoption of the state's term
limits measure in 1990, and would continue to fall after the term limits became
effective in 1996.147

Just as important, the figures also suggest increased donor targeting of particular
races, given the much greater increases in the amounts raised for the most expensive
races. Indeed, Common Cause itself provided the following interpretation of the
California data, based on a more detailed analysis of underlying contribution patterns:
The record amounts raised by open seat candidates during the 1995-

1996 election cycle reinforces [sic] a trend initiated by term limits. In the
pre-term limit years, contributors would focus their funds on legislative
leaders, . . . who would then transfer to other candidates. While
contributors still cater to legislative leaders, there has been a marked
increase in the amount of contributions given directly to open seat
candidates during the post-term limit years. With a constant supply of open
seats, big contributors have had48the opportunity to directly determine the
makeup of the new legislature. 1
The Common Cause study does not include any detailed data concerning
campaign expenditures, in addition to contributions, nor does it make distinctions
between the primary and general election periods. 149 The study is also limited in not

adjusting for inflation, focusing on just one state and just one election cycle (except for
the broadest comparisons with previous years in overall fundraising), and providing
descriptive statistics without tests of statistical significance.

144. See http://www.commoncause.org/states/califomia/archives/lastwaltz%2dl996fundr
aising/recipients.html. The presence of thirty open seats (twenty-four forced open by term
limits) in 1996, compared to twenty-two open seats in 1994, helps explain this almost two-fold
increase, but the per-seat increase was also dramatic. See id.
145. See id.

146. See id.
147. See Daniel & Lott, supra note 98, at 174-76. Unfortunately, Daniel & Lott's study did
not include data from the 1994 California primary election, see id. at 172, potentially a
significant weakness to the extent that term limits may have their most noticeable impact on
competition at the primary stage for open seats, especially in districts generally viewed as "safe"
for a particular political party.
148. See http://www.commoncause.org/states/califomia/archives/lastwaltz%2d1996 fundra
ising/recipients.html.
149. However, a separate Common Cause study of PAC contributions in the 1996 primary
election reported that while in 1990 only 6% of contributions from the top ten PACs went to
open seat candidates, in 1996 the figure had climbed to 61%, and concluded that "the grip [of
special interests] has tightened" after term limits. See http://www.commoncause.org/states
/califomia/archives/primarystudy.htm at I (last visited Jan. 22,2004). Not reported in this study
is whether the percentage increase in the number of open seats between 1990 and 1996 matches
the percentage increase in PAC contributions to open seat candidates.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:427

Michigan 1998. In a more focused study of the effect of term limits, two
Michigan political scientists, Dalene Allebaugh and Neil Pinney, examined several
aspects of electoral costs and competition by comparing data from the 1994 and 1998
primary elections for the Michigan House of Representatives. 50 This study has the
clear advantage of segregating expenditures in primary election contests from
expenditures in general election contests. It also adjusted for inflation and included
Ohio (a comparable neighboring state where term limits had not yet taken effect in
1998) as a control state. However, like the California study, this study also described
its results without reporting their statistical significance and reported its financial data
only in terms of mean or average figures (which can be highly influenced by just a few
outliers), rather than in terms of medians.
With respect to campaign costs, the Michigan study found that the average total
district expenditures per open primary rose 53%, from just over $43,000 in 1994 to
almost $66,000 in 1998 (in constant 1998 dollars), at the same time that average total
district spending per incumbent primary rose only 27%, from about $23,000 to slightly
under $30,000.151 To control for the potential impact of rising campaign costs
generally, Allebaugh and Pinney compared the Michigan results with data from Ohio
that showed an increase in incumbent district spending and a decrease in open district
spending. 52The authors conclude that "the implementation of term limits in Michigan
dramatically increases the typical campaign costs per district in open races with modest
53
increases in incumbent races."'
Allebaugh and Pinney also examined the impact of term limits on voter
participation, finding that while the number of primary voters declined in open races in
Ohio, as well as in incumbent races in both Ohio and Michigan, term limits may have
prevented a comparable decline in races for Michigan's open house seats. 54 However,
the authors note that as a result of the essentially static level of voter participation, the
cost per primary vote in Michigan's open races increased 62.2% (from $4.58 to $7.43)
from 1994 to 1998.155 In conjunction with other measures of the competitiveness of
Michigan's post-term limits elections, they conclude that "the lack of increased
competition could potentially be explained by the increase in electoral campaign costs
and the associated average
cost per vote.... [P]erhaps many candidates are simply
156
priced out of the race."'
The Michigan study examined campaign expenditure data at the district level,
however. In other words, rather than comparing individual candidate expenditures, the
study aggregated all candidates within each district. As a result, it does not lend itself
to evaluating the extent to which individual candidates may be more beholden to their
contributors, or to identifying potential differences between types of candidates, such
as primary winners and losers.

150. See Allebaugh & Pinney, supra note 113, at 163.
151. Id. at 169.
152. It is difficult to compare Allebaugh & Pinney's use of Ohio as a control with the pilot
Ohio study described in Part lI.B herein because Allebaugh & Pinney studied the
nonpresidential election years of 1994 and 1998 (when term limits took effect in the Michigan
House), whereas the Ohio study examines the presidential election years of 1996 and 2000
(when term limits took effect in Ohio).
153. Allebaugh & Pinney, supra note 113, at 169.
154. See id. at 171.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 173.
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B. Ohio GeneralAssembly Campaign Costs, 1996-2000

To assess more extensively the predictions of term limits analysts and the
perceptions of firsthand observers, we now consider data from races for both chambers
of the Ohio General Assembly from both before and after the onset of term limits. Like
the California study, these analyses focus on just one state and compare only two
election cycles. The current study, however, includes more detailed information on
individual candidates, in both primary and general elections. It also encompasses both
chambers of the state legislature, uses constant dollars to measure effects, and reports
medians as well as means. For some analyses, the database is sufficiently large to
permit appropriate tests of statistical significance. The Ohio study thus offers important
corroboration of the California and Michigan analyses, while adding to a growing body
of state-by-state analyses.
Method. In exploring the impact of term limits in Ohio, this study considers
campaign data from both the primary and general elections for all seats in the Ohio
General Assembly on the ballot in 1996, 1998, and 2000.157 The data include both
campaign finance report information and election return information for all candidates
for the General Assembly who filed campaign finance reports with the Ohio Secretary
of State, as required under state law,158 and who appear on the secretary of state's
official election returns. 59 To account for inflation, all dollar figures were adjusted to
constant 1996 values. 160 The data have been further coded for each candidate's party
affiliation, as well as for each candidate's status as either an incumbent, a challenger,
or a candidate seeking an open seat.' 6' Significance tests, as well as most of the
underlying
analyses of the data, were conducted using the statistical software program
16 2
SPSS.

157. Much of the underlying data can be obtained electronically from the office of the Ohio
Secretary of State. See http:llserform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/campFinlindex.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2004).
158. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.10 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2002).
159. Several candidates who filed preliminary reports apparently dropped out and did not
appear on the ballot.
160. Specifically, 1998 dollar values have been divided by 1.0389, and 2000 dollar values
have been divided by 1.0975, using adjustment factors calculated using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics "Inflation Calculator." See http://www.bls.gov/ (calculating that $1000 in 1996 has the
same buying power as $1038.88 in 1998, and $1097.51 in 2000).
161. The study treats a seat as "open" if at the time of the primary election the sitting
incumbent was not seeking re-election. A candidate is classified as an incumbent as long as the
candidate occupied the seat at the time of the primary election, even if by way of prior
appointment to fill a vacancy. Accordingly, some legislators treated as incumbents may not have
been elected to their legislative office. In those occasional circumstances in which, after the
primary, an outgoing incumbent not seeking reelection stepped down early and was replaced by
one of the declared candidates (who thereby became the de facto incumbent), the seat remained
coded as "open" for purposes of the study.
162. Release 11.5.2 (2002). Standard t-tests of significance were used on the measures of
competitiveness reported in Tables 1-3. For the expenditures and contributions reported in
Tables 4-10, for which the distribution of the data was skewed to the right, rather than normal
(not surprising for this type of financial data), the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank sum test was
used to test for significance. See FRED L. RAMSEY & DANIEL W. SCHAFER, THE STATISTICAL
SLEuTH 89-90 (2002); JAY L. DEVORE, PROBABILITY & STATISTICS FOR ENGINEERING AND THE
SCIENCES 582-84 (1982). The rank sum test lumps all observations from two studied populations
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Ohio's term limits first excluded incumbents from seeking reelection in 2000, so
the analyses focus on differences that appear in that election cycle compared to the two
previous elections. 163 The principal comparison is with the 1996 race, both because of
the potentially confounding effects of comparing a presidential election year with a
nonpresidential election year, 164 and because comparing 2000 with 1996 has the virtue
of involving the same set of districts for the Ohio Senate, where terms last four years
and only half of the senate seats are up for election every two years.
The study analyzes changes at both the individual candidate level and the district
level, in contrast with the Michigan study's district-only analysis. Key inquiries are
whether particular kinds of races, such as those for open seats or those involving
incumbents, produce noticeable changes in campaign spending or contribution
patterns. Like Michigan, but unlike many states, 165 Ohio collects and maintains
166
campaign finance report data separately for primary and general election periods,
making it possible to consider impacts at the primary election stage separately from the
general election stage. Changes in campaign spending receive greater attention in part
because contributions data were not reported
consistently between 1996 and 2000,
167
necessitating some imperfect adjustments.
(or samples) together, ranks them in ascending value, sums the ranks of the observations drawn
from the first population (or sample), sums the ranks of the observations drawn from the second
population (or sample), and compares these rank sums to determine the likelihood that the
distribution of the observations among the two populations may have occurred by chance. See
RAMSEY & SCHAFER, supra. This likelihood, or probability, is reported as the "p" value in the
tables. In addition, because of the skewed nature of the financial data, the text discussion usually
focuses on comparisons between medians, rather than means, although means are also reported.
See id. at 70-71; see also ARTHUR ARON & ELAINE N. ARON, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES: A BRIEF COURSE 27 (1997) (explaining the difference between mean and

median). Because of the pilot nature of the study and the small size of the candidate populations
examined, the study does not subject the data to multivariate analyses. Spreadsheets and full
statistical analyses of the data are available from the author on request.
163. Of course, to the extent that term limits do affect campaign costs, some anticipatory
effects may also have appeared in elections before 2000, but such anticipatory effects are less
likely to influence the costs in races for open seats unless those seats have become open by
reason of term limits, which could not occur in Ohio until 2000.
164. Contribution and expenditure patterns for state legislative races may be affected by
other races on the ticket, especially presidential or gubernatorial contests, both of which may
sap potential contributions while at the same time increasing the effort required for legislative
candidates to get voters' attention. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 30-31.
165. See Moncrief, supra note 24, at 41-42.
166. Ohio actually requires candidates to submit two primary and two general election
reports, one due twelve days before each election (covering all expenditures and receipts during
the period up to twenty days before the election), and one due thirty-eight days after each
election (covering the period lasting until thirty-one days after the election). In deriving the
results to follow, data from pre-primary and post-primary reports have been aggregated, as have
been data from the pre-general and post-general reports. This is not a perfect grouping, but it is
sufficient for purposes of this study. Candidates who filed some but not all reports are treated as
filing zeros in the missing reports. Candidates who filed no reports for any period have been
dropped from the analysis. (Candidates are not required to file a report for a period in which
they have nothing to report, or to file pre-primary or pre-general reports if they have neither
received nor expended an amount equal to or greater than $1000.).
167. Specifically, in 1996 Ohio law did not require a candidate's contributions report to
reflect the candidate's own personal funds expended on campaign activities, but a 1997
amendment required these amounts to be included in the 1998 and 2000 reports relied on for
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Limitations. Before exploring the study's results, three limitations deserve brief
mention. The first is that the study lacks a control in the form of analogous data for the
same period from a comparable state legislature without term limits. Comparisons with
non-term-limited states would add value and are worthy of future analysis. Such
comparisons will take longer to achieve because of significant state-to-state variations
in data collection methods and in the nature of legislative campaigns.' 68 Meanwhile,
the previous California and Michigan studies provide a somewhat broader context in
which to view the Ohio results.
Second, the study draws data from only one election cycle after the onset of
Ohio's legislative term limits provision. Data from the 2002 election are not included
because final campaign finance reports and other data for this election were not yet
available when the study commenced. In addition, although including 2002 data among
the post-term limits observations would be meaningful, it also would introduce the
potentially confounding effect of the legislative redistricting that had by then occurred
in Ohio in response to the 2000 decennial U.S. census. Furthermore, the study's
working hypothesis was that the most interesting comparisons, all other things equal,
would be between the elections immediately before and immediately after the onset of
term limits (1998 and 2000 in Ohio). As previously described, however, all other
things are not equal, because of the four-year cycles for both presidential as well as
Ohio Senate elections. Therefore, in important ways 1996 provides a better
comparison with 2000.169 Thus, the study considers data from the three election cycles
of 1996, 1998, and 2000.
Finally, errors and omissions in the candidates' campaign finance reports could
distort the results of the study. Like most states, Ohio has little means to assure the
accuracy of the information submitted each election by hundreds of candidates and
their campaign committees about thousands of contributors and expenses. Moreover,
variations undoubtedly exist in the degree to which the report filers understand their
campaign finance disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, provided that error rates do not
change markedly from year to year, and that the bulk of the reports are accurate and
complete, we ought still to be able to draw meaningful conclusions from the available
data.
Results. Although the study's principal results concern campaign expenditures
and contributions, two measures of competition are worth noting first. One is the
number of candidates running for each seat (Table 1), while the other is the margin of
victory (Tables 2 and 3). After describing these two measures, the study turns to a
consideration of changes in the campaign expenditures of individual candidates for the
Ohio House or Ohio Senate (Tables 4, 5, and 6). The study then reports changes in
campaign expenditures on a per district basis (Table 7), and also looks at campaign
costs per vote (Table 8). Next, the study segregates by political party the changes in
individual candidate expenditures, as well as contributions (Tables 9 and 10). Finally,
this study. See 1997 Ohio Laws 7608-68 (codified as amended in scattered sections of OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3517, 3599). In an effort to account for this change, the study compares
only those contributions not reported in the category "candidates and candidate committees" (as
the contributions data was coded by Ohio Citizen Action), a category which includes both
contributions from a candidate's own funds as well as transfers from other candidates' funds.
168. As described above, the nature of campaigning for any particular state's legislature is
almost sui generis. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
169. Including data from prior to the 1996 election cycle would also introduce the
additional complication that Ohio's campaign finance law underwent significant amendment in
1995. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3517 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2002).
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the study looks at changes in the timing of contributions to candidates (Chart 1).
1. Increased Competition
To begin to evaluate the extent to which term limits may have altered the
competitiveness of legislative elections, the first three tables consider changes in both
the number of candidates running for office and the margins of victory.
Table I
Primary Candidates Per Seat
Ohio General Assembly
1996
1998
Total Seats
115
117
Total Primary Candidates
253
291
Overall Candidates per Seat
2.20
2.49

2000
116
342
2.95

('96-'00)

.000

Open Seats
Open Primary Candidates
Candidates per Open Seat

10
30
3.00

16
56
3.50

50
191
3.82

Incumbent Seats
Incumbent Primary Candidates

105
223

101
235

66
151

Candidates per Incumbent Seat

2.12

2.33

2.29

.237

Ohio House
Total Seats
Total Primary Candidates
Overall Candidates per Seat
Open seats
Open Primary Candidates
Candidates per Open Seat

1996
99
213
2.15
6
21
3.50

1998
99
243
2.45
11
41
3.73

2000
99
300
3.03
43
170
3.95

p('96-'00)

Incumbent Seats
Incumbent Primary Candidates
Candidates per Incumbent Seat

93
192
2.06

88
202
2.30

56
130
2.32

Ohio Senate
Total Seats
Total Primary Candidates
Overall Candidates per seat

1996
16
40
2.50

1998
18
48
2.67

2000
17
42
2.47

Open Seats
Open Primary Candidates
Candidates per Open Seat

4
9
2.25

5
15
3.0

7
21
3.0

Incumbent Seats
Incumbent Primary Candidates

12
31

13
33

10
21

Candidates per Incumbent Seat

2.58

2.54

2.10

.113

.000

.478

.067
p('96-'00)

.946

.403

.350

One measure of whether term limits may have affected campaigning and electoral
competition is whether the number of candidates running for each seat has increased.
As summarized in Table 1, between 1996 and 2000 an additional 0.75 candidates per
seat were drawn to enter races for the Ohio General Assembly (2.20 candidates per
district in 1996, versus 2.95 in 2000).170 This statistically significant increase appears
primarily attributable to a comparable (and also statistically significant) increase in the
number of candidates competing for seats in the Ohio House of Representatives, as
essentially no change occurred
between 1996 and 2000 in the number of candidates
7
running for the Ohio Senate.1 1

170. These increases are larger if candidates who filed no campaign finance reports are
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Also apparent from the data in Table 1 is that, with the exception of senate races
in 1996, the number of candidates running in open seat races is consistently greater
than the number of candidates running in incumbent races. As a result, the raw increase
in the number of open seats in both chambers (from 10 seats in 1996 to 50 seats in
2000), itself a dramatic reflection of the onset of term limits, partially accounts for the
overall increase in candidates per seat. But another factor contributing to the overall
increase in candidates per seat between 1996 and 2000 is that the number of candidates
per open seat also rose from 3.0 to 3.82. This change is not statistically significant,
perhaps in part because of the restricted population, but the change is even larger than
the statistically significant increase for all seats.
An additional result that approaches statistical significance is that in the Ohio
House the number of primary candidates competing for seats held by incumbents
(including candidates in opposite party primaries) increased by 0.26 candidates per
seat between 1996 and 2000. Almost all of this increase had occurred by 1998,
however, before term limits took effect. Nevertheless, it is possible that additional
candidates may have been drawn to compete in these races as an anticipatory effect of
term limits, in order to build political experience, name recognition, and organizational
support, in preparation for the certain (and not very distant) day when the seat would
be open. 172
A somewhat larger increase, albeit one lacking in statistical significance, in the
number of primary candidates per open house seat appears to be another factor
contributing to the overall increase in house candidates per seat. In 1996, twenty-one
candidates competed for six open house seats (out of ninety-nine districts). In 2000,
170 candidates competed in the primaries for forty-three open seats. Again, the raw
increase in the number of open seats explains most of the increase in the absolute
number of candidates. On a per seat basis, the average open district had only 0.45 more
candidates competing for it in 2000 than competed for it in 1996 (3.95 versus 3.50
candidates per district).
As previously indicated, on the senate side essentially no change occurred in the
overall number of candidates per seat. It is interesting to note, however, that the
number of candidates per incumbent seat declined, at the same time that the open seat
figure rose by 0.75 candidates. But the open seat increase was complete by 1998, and
as the p-values in Table 1 reflect, neither trend was sufficiently pronounced to be
included, as these essentially nonviable candidates were more common post-term limits. The
exclusion of these candidates from the data in this study is not meant to belittle the importance,
symbolic or otherwise, of having these additional candidates in the field. Still, at least some
amount of reported spending seems a fair requisite for any legitimate candidate today, and it is
the financing of these candidates' campaigns that is the focus of this study.
171. Following the usual social science convention, I designate relationships with a p level
less than 0.05 as "statistically significant." Relationships with a p level less than 0.10 are
referred to as "approaching significance." See ARON & ARON, supra note 162, at 104; see also
Deborah Jones Merritt, ConstructingIdentity in Law andSocial Science, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 731,736 n.3 (2001). Although theoretical predictions and previous studies of term limits
might support directional hypotheses, this study uses two-tailed significance tests for all
relationships. This somewhat conservative measure is appropriate given the fledgling nature of
empirical study in this area and the complex interplay of factors. See, e.g., ARON & ARON, supra
note 162, at 99-104.
172. Accordingly, a potential further inquiry related to this possibility would be to study
whether the number of candidates running correlates to the time left before the incumbent is
termed out.
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statistically significant in a population of this limited size.
Nevertheless, it is clear that a statistically significant increase in the total number
of candidates per seat has accompanied the onset of term limits in Ohio. This increase
appears to be primarily the result of a greater number of open seats, coupled with a
modest increase in the number of candidates running for house incumbent seats, and
somewhat larger but not statistically significant increases in the number of candidates
per open seat in both the house and senate. In every category, the increases had begun
by 1998, raising the question of whether anticipatory effects of term limits were
already altering the nature of political competition, or whether some factor independent
of term Emits may be at least partially responsible. Further study, perhaps across many
states with and without term limits, and over longer periods of time, may more clearly
reflect whether term limits produce meaningful increases in the number of candidates
per primary seat. Certainly in Ohio the immediate impact of term limits on the number
of candidates per seat was not dramatic, beyond the impact attributable to the sheer
increase in the number of open seats.
Table 2
Average Margins of Victory in Races for Seats in the Ohio House of Representatives (excluding races in
which the winner received 100% of the official vote)
General Election
Primary Election
1998
2000
p('96-'00)
2000
p('96-'00) 1 1996
1996
1998
.029
35%
32%
19%
.001
36%
33%
30%
All Seats
(n=89)
(n=32)
(n--56)
(n--90)
(n=84)
(n=26)
.299
40%
34%
21%
.009
37%
32%
33%
Incumbent
Seats
(n-=20)
(n=22)
(n=14)
(n=84)
(n=73)
(n--49)
Open Seats

17%
(n=6)

27%
(n=10)

19%
(n=42)

.781

21%
(n=6)

36%
(n- 11)

25%
(n--40)

.600

A different measure of competitiveness is the margin of victory. Using this
measure, both primary and general elections for seats in the Ohio House of
Representatives became increasingly close or competitive overall between 1996 and
2000, as shown in Table 2. The most substantial tightening of the average margin of
victory occurred in primary races in the 2000 election. The margin of victory in the 56
primaries that year was only 19%, a significant decline from the mean margin of 35%
in 1996. This decline was due in part to an increase in the number of open seat
primaries, which one might expect to show smaller margins of victory than those for
incumbents.173 The number of open primary elections for seats in the Ohio House
increased fourfold between 1998 and 2000, and those contests retained relatively low
margins of victory.
Notably, however, a significant decline in victory margins in races involving
incumbents also contributed to the overall decline. The mean margin of victory in
incumbent primaries declined from 40% in 1996 to 21% in 2000, a statistically
significant decrease. In 2000, the average primary race involving an incumbent did not
produce a victory margin much greater than that in an open primary. This increased
competitiveness of primaries in incumbent-controlled districts might be associated with
Ohio's
adoption of term limits, although further study is needed to confirm such a
174
link.

173. See David Breaux & Malcolm Jewell, Winning Big: The Incumbency Advantage in
State Legislative Elections, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CAREERS 87, 97-98
(Gary F. Moncrief & Joel A. Thompson eds., 1992).

174. Comparison with states that did not adopt term limits, for example, would be
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The mean margin of victory in the general election also showed a statistically
significant decline for house races, from 36% in 1996 to 30% in 2000. As with primary
elections, this may reflect both an increase in the number of open seats and some
tightening of incumbent races. The tightening of incumbent races, however, was not
nearly as dramatic as in the primaries. Indeed, despite a larger population of races, the
decline was not statistically significant. The principal effect
175in the general election
seems due to the bare increase in the number of open seats.
Table 3
Average Margins of Victory in Races for Seats in the Ohio Senate (excluding races in which the
winner received 100% of the official vote)
Primary Election
General Election
1996
2000
p
1996
2000
p
All Seats
34%
21%
.128
28%
33%
.269
(n=6)
(n=5)
(n=16)
(n=15)
Incumbent Seats
35%
15%
*
30%
33%
.572
(n=5)
(n=l)
(n=12)
(n=9)
Open Seats
28%
23%
*
22%
34%
.336
(n= 1)
(n--4)
(n=4)
(n=6)
* The significance here is not calculated given the very small number of observations.

Races for the Ohio Senate (Table 3) showed both similarities and differences with
the house, although the much smaller number of observations makes it difficult to draw
any firm conclusions. 76 In primary contests, mean margins of victory appear to have
declined, as in the house, although the difference is not statistically significant for this
population size. Patterns for both incumbent and open primary races match those in the
house (an increase in the number of open seats, and a decline in victory margins for
races for incumbent seats), but the very small number of cases precludes any statistical
analysis.
In the general election, margins of victory for senate seats increased in all
categories between 1996 and 2000. Although the results are not statistically significant,
they present an intriguing contrast to the house data, where the mean margin of victory
illuminating. It would also be worth probing the intermediate decline in 1998. Does this reflect
an anticipatory effect of term limits or is it a sign that other trends independently were
tightening races?
Even if a declining margin of victory for incumbent primaries is associated with term
limits, this may signal a change in the nature of the incumbents rather than a change in the way
particular races are conducted. Term limits remove from the pool the most senior incumbents,
who are both most likely to enjoy large margins of victory in any primary, and most likely to
discourage opposite party candidates from entering their own party's primary race for the seat.
The remaining, more junior incumbents, may always have tolerated smaller margins of victory.
The competitiveness of a primary race for a one- or two-term incumbent, in other words, may
not have changed after term limits. Those races may simply be more visible in the "incumbent"
category after the elimination of more senior incumbents.
175. The margin of victory in open seats increased nominally between 1996 and 2000, but
the difference was not significant and may reflect variation unrelated to term limits. Even with
this increase, the victory margin for open seats was lower than for incumbent seats, bringing
down the overall margin.
176. In 1996, only one Ohio Senate primary election for an open seat was contested,
compared to four in 2000. Similarly, while in 1996 five Ohio Senate primary elections for seats
held by incumbents were contested (four involving the incumbents themselves and one an
opposite party primary), by 2000 only one primary race (an opposite party race) fit this category.
It is inappropriate to draw any conclusions from these single-observation categories.
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declined significantly for seats overall. A consistent trend in the opposite direction in
the senate suggests a difference that is worth exploring. It is possible that the open
senate seats in 2000 attracted popular incumbents from the house, who had been termlimited in that chamber. This could explain the increasing margin of victory in contests
for open seats.
In sum, while the raw number of open seats resulting from Ohio's term limit
measure produced a large increase in the overall number of candidates running for
office in 2000, the number of viable' 77 candidates per open seat did not increase
significantly. The mean margin of victory in both house and senate primaries has
declined, however, suggesting increased competition after term limits. Notably, in the
house these margins declined significantly even in races for seats held by
incumbents.178 Results for the general election were more mixed, with a significant
decline in the mean margin of victory for seats overall in the house, but a less marked
decrease in margins of victory for incumbents in that chamber, and constant (albeit
nonsignificant) increases in victory margins for the senate. These results appear
inconsistent with claims that term limits would discourage challengers from taking on
incumbents, 179 but consistent
with expectations that primary elections would take on
80
increased importance.'
2. Increased Primary Expenditures
Aside from the preceding measures of changes in competition, the Ohio data
reveal several interesting changes in campaign financing, particularly in connection
with primary elections. These data are presented first at the individual candidate level,
then aggregated at the district level. To provide a context for these data, and in
particular to have a sense of the general increases in campaign costs occurring during
this period, Table 4 begins by presenting summary information about a few general
trends in Ohio campaign expenditures between 1996 and 2000.181

177. As previously noted, candidates who filed no campaign finance reports were not
considered viable. See supra note 170.
178. The decline occurred both in opposite party primaries, as well as in the incumbent's
intraparty primary. Specifically, the average margin of primary victory dropped from 44%
among the thirteen incumbents challenged in their own primary in 1996 to 32% among the six
incumbents challenged in their 2000 primary.
179. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. The possibility remains that term
limits may substantially reduce challenges to incumbents in later terms, however, as the study
data do not distinguish between challenges to first-term incumbents and challenges to later-term
incumbents.
180. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
181. As explained previously, see supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text, analyses in
this section focus primarily on medians and use nonparametric tests of significance to account
for the skewed distribution of the data. Like many sets of financial data, campaign expenditures
and contributions show a strong rightward skew. In this circumstance, analyses that focus on the
"middle," or median, values are more helpful than those focusing on the arithmetic mean.
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Table 4
Campaign Expenditures for the Ohio General Assembly - Per Candidate

Median Primary Expenditures
Mean Primary Expenditures

1996

2000

% change

p

$1,927

$3,463

80%

.024

$6,886

$13,412

14%

.174

20%

.092

9%

.820

(n=249)

(n=342)

Median General Election Expenditures

$20,611

$23,460

Mean General Election Expenditures

$34,458

$44,886

(n=214)

(n=240)

Median Total Campaign Expenditures

$23,279

$28,005

Mean Total Campaign Expenditures

$40,639

$55,889

(among candidates in general election)

(n=214)

(n=240)

Median Total Campaign Expenditures

$18,283

$19,994

Mean Total Campaign Expenditures

$36,339

$44,958

(among all candidates)

(n=252)

(n=342)

As Table 4 reflects, median candidate primary expenditures in races for the Ohio
legislature rose 80% between 1996 and 2000, increasing from $1927 to $3463, after
adjusting for inflation. 182 This change is statistically significant using the Wilcoxon
(Mann-Whitney) rank sum test. 183 In contrast, median candidate expenditures in the
general election rose only 14%, from $20,611 to $23,460, and total campaign
expenditures for candidates who competed in the general election rose only 20%.
These changes did not achieve statistical significance, although the latter result
approaches significance. Increases in general election spending, therefore, were much
more modest than increases in primary spending, and may even reflect random
variation.
The sizeable change in primary election expenditures, when general election
spending remained constant or increased slightly, suggests that a real change occurred
in primary contests-a change that occurred as term limits took effect. Rising costs of
advertising, mailing, or campaign workers, which would affect all elections, cannot
explain the difference. Of course, the change in primary expenditures may simply have
coincided with term limits, and might not be linked to them. The change, for example,
might reflect an increasing professionalization of primary campaigns, or an increased
focus on those campaigns as districting techniques have made general elections
increasingly safe for the dominant party in each district. The pattern, however, suggests
a possible impact of term limits, consistent with predictions that term limits would
render primaries more important. In the discussion to follow, these primary
expenditure increases are further broken down by chamber (house versus senate) and
by type of seat (open versus incumbent).

182. In adjusting for inflation, all figures herein are presented in 1996 dollars.
183. See supra note 162.
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Table 5
Selected 1996-2000 Ohio House Primary Expenditures - Per Candidate
All Races
1996
2000
% Change
Median Primary Expenditures
$1,793
$2,757
54%
Mean Primary Expenditures
$5,975
$11,643
(n=213)
(n=300)
Median Expenditures in Open Primary
$4,539
$4,290
-5%
Mean Expenditures in Open Primary
$18,943
$13,498
(n=21)
(n= 170)
Median Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
$1,665
$1,935
16%
Mean Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
$4,556
$9,217
(n=130)
(n=192)
Median Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
$3,468
$7,256
109%
Mean Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
$7,098
$16,189
(n=93)
(n=57)
Median Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
$257
$698
172%
Mean Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
$2,169
$3,772
(n=73)
(n=99)
Contested Races (winner received < 100% of vote)
1996
2000
% Change
Median Primary Expenditures
Mean Primary Expenditures
Median Expenditures in Open Primary
Mean Expenditures in Open Primary
Median Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
Mean Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
Median Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
Mean Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
Median Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
Mean Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS

$4,156
$12,292
(n=53)
$9,180
$25,725
(n=15)
$2,828
$6,989
(n=38)
$4,551
$8,987
(n=14)
$2,459
$5,824
(n=24)

$7,143
$19,312
(n=143)
$6,733
$19,246
(n=113)
$9,444
$19,562
(n=30)
$15,048
$44,473
(n=8)
$5,424
$10,503
(n=22)

p
.014

.489

.101

.015

.346

p

72%

.076

-27%

.714

234%

.057

231%

.034

121%

.262

Table 5 displays data for selected categories of candidates on the house side.
Consistent with the statistically significant increase in median primary expenditures
among all candidates for the Ohio General Assembly reported in Table 4, median
primary expenditures among house candidates also experienced a statistically
significant 54% increase between 1996 and 2000. In contested primaries, the increase
in median expenditures was somewhat greater (72%), although in this smaller
population this result only approaches significance. Not surprisingly, one factor in the
overall increase in house primary expenditures was that the number of contested
primaries (generally much more expensive than uncontested races) more than doubled,
rising from 26 in 1996 to 56 in 2000. 84 Meanwhile, the number of candidates in these
races almost tripled, rising from 53 to 143. But this increase in the frequency of
contested races and number of candidates therein only partially explains the overall
increase in house primary expenditures.

184. See supra tbl.2. Where Table 2 reports the margins of victory in contested races on a
per racebasis, Table 5 reports expenditures on aper candidatebasis. The per candidate data for
contested races in Table 5 is drawn from the same races presented in Table 2, however.
(Similarly, the per candidate data for contested races in Table 6 is drawn from the same races
presented in Table 3.).
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Another contributing factor was a 109% increase, also statistically significant, in
median primary expenditures by house incumbents. This increase was far greater
(231%), and again statistically significant, among incumbents in contested races. These
increases are consistent with the significantly tighter margins of victory in primary
elections for house incumbent seats, described in Table 2 above. Meanwhile, the data
in Table 5 also reflect that challengers remain heavily outspent by incumbents.
Also contributing to the overall increase in median primary expenditures on the
house side was the increase in the number of open primaries. Although the median
expenditure within this category actually dropped slightly (but not significantly), this
type of race nevertheless remained much more expensive than incumbent races, thus
pulling up the overall median as the number of candidates in open primaries rose from
21 in 1996 to 170 in 2000.
Table 6
Selected 1996-2000 Ohio Senate Primary Expenditures - Per Candidate
2000
% Change
1996
All Races
22%
$3,817
$4,645
Median Primary Expenditures
$12,280
$26,047
Mean Primary Expenditures
(n=36)
(n=42)
70%
$3,770
$6,396
Median Expenditures in Open Primary
$46,815
$8,388
Mean Expenditures in Open Primary
(n=21)
(n--9)
15%
$3,863
$4,433
Median Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
$13,577
$5,279
Mean Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
(n=27)
(n=21)
-59%
$17,944
$7,427
Median Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
$25,278
$8,116
Mean Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
(n=12)
(n=10)
$1,530
$423
-72%
Median Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
$4,216
$2,700
Mean Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
(n=l1)
(n=15)
2000
% Change
1996
Contested Races (winner received < 100% of vote)
-6%
$20,645
$19,401
Median Primary Expenditures
$27,661
$60,374
Mean Primary Expenditures
(n=14)
(n=1)
$15,520
$36,039
132%
Median Expenditures in Open Primary
$15,520
$81,857
Mean Expenditures in Open Primary
(n=2)
(n=10)
$5,902
-73%
$21,969
Median Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
$6,665
$30,359
Mean Expenditures in Incumbent Primary
(n=4)
(n--9)
NA
NA
$56,326
Median Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
$56,049
NA
NA
Mean Primary Expenditures BY INCUMBENTS
$7,230
$9,807
(n=5)
• The significance here is not calculated given the very small

Median Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS
Mean Primary Exp. BY CHALLENGERS

-18%
$5,902
$6,665
(n=4)
number of observations.

p
.865

.308

.412

.147

.483

p
1.00

*

.123

*

.624

The picture on the senate side (Table 6) is somewhat different, although the
number of cases is small, and none of the changes is statistically significant when
observed at the individual candidate level. Nevertheless, the 70% increase in median
open primary expenditures bears some consideration, particularly in contrast with the
decline in primary spending by senate incumbents, and in connection with the districtlevel results reported in Table 7 below. The downward trend in expenditures by senate
incumbents also is suggestive in light of the significant upward trend in house
incumbent primaries.
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The larger differences in mean expenditures, particularly in open senate primaries,
also merit brief comment. Between 1996 and 2000 the mean in open primary
expenditures increased five-fold, compared to a much more modest increase in the
median, suggesting that some targeted open races may have been particularly hardfought or attracted especially heavy support. Indeed, the most expensive primary race
for an open senate seat cost just over $20,000 in 1996, but that figure climbed to more
than $324,000 in 2000.
Table 7
1996-1998-2000 Ohio House & Senate Primary Race Expenditures - Per District
96
1996
1998"
2000
p(' -'00)
Senate Open Median Exp.
$12,990
[$30,377]
$58,880
.023
Senate Open Mean Exp.
$18,872
[$85,255]
$140,444
(n=4)
(n=5)
(n=7)
Senate Incumbent Median Exp.
$22,489
[$18,416]
$8,222
.210
Senate Incumbent Mean Exp.
$30,548
[$37,831]
$11,086
(n=12)
(n=13)
(n=10)
House Open Median Exp.
$27,309
$23,070
$29,637
.784
House Open Mean Exp.
$66,302
$41,316
$53,364
(n--6)
(n= 11)
(n=43)
House Incumbent Median Exp.
$4,620
$7,533
$9,886
.022
House Incumbent Mean Exp.
$9,407
$11,855
$21,396
(n=93)
(n=88)
(n=56)
*For the Senate only, 1998 data involve an entirely different group of districts than 1996 and 2000 data involve.

To provide a more direct comparison with Allebaugh and Pinney's 1998 Michigan
study, we can also analyze the Ohio data by district. The results, summarized in Table
7, show that on a per district basis as well, the 2000 election in Ohio saw interesting
changes in both house and senate primary races. Open senate districts experienced the
most dramatic change, with median expenditures rising 353%, from $12,990 to
$58,880. Incumbent races in the house also saw a large increase, with median
expenditures rising 114%, from $4620 to $9886. Both of these changes were
statistically significant, as well as consistent with trends in individual candidate
spending in these races observed in Tables 5 and 6 above. But where Allebaugh.and
Pinney reported a 53% increase in mean open primary expenditures per district for the
Michigan House between 1994 and 1998,185 the comparable data from the Ohio House
between 1996 and 2000 show a decrease, from $66,302 to $53,364. The median, a
more reliable measure given the skewed financial data, increased modestly from
$27,309 to $29,637. This change was not statistically significant, however.
One reason that the Ohio study may not have found any significant change in
expenditures for open house seats, where other studies have reported sizable increases,
is that the 1996 expenditures for these races may have been aberrationally high.
Indeed, one interesting feature of the data in Tables 5, 6, and 7 is that, although we
might predict costs for Ohio House races to be substantially lower than costs for Ohio
senate races (assuming a low ratio of fixed to variable costs in political campaigns, and
given that Ohio's house districts are one-third the size of senate districts), expenditures
for open house seats in 1996 in fact were substantially greater than expenditures for
open senate seats that year. This in itself is surprising, and suggests some additional
factor may have been at play in 1996 Ohio House open seat races.
One possible factor is that the Ohio Democratic Party had just lost control of the

185. See Allebaugh & Pinney, supra note 113, at 169 tbl.11.4.
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chamber in the preceding election, and was fighting hard in 1996 to regain the lost
ground, while the Republican Party was seeking to cement its hold. To the extent that
general election contests for open seats were a key battleground in this effort, both
Republican and Democratic candidates may also have focused more intensely on
certain primary races, to enhance their profile and prepare their campaigns. In this
environment, expenditure figures for these races may not provide the best baseline for
comparing with the 2000 election.' 86 Data from 1998 therefore are also included in
Table 7 for comparison.
Table 8
Total Expenditures per Candidate per Primary Election Vote
House
Senate
1996
2000
p
1996
2000
Median - All Races
$0.30
$0.59
.007
$0.22
$0.27
Mean - All Races
$1.27
$2.11
$0.71
$1.23
(n=2 11)
(n=295)
(n=36)
(n=4 1)
Median - Open Seats
$1.26
$0.89
.387
$0.25
$0.55
Mean - Open Seats
$3.88
$2.66
$0.58
$2.03
(n=21)
(n=168)
(n=9)
(n=21)
Median - Incumbents
$0.46
$0.61
.128
$0.65
$0.20
Mean - Incumbents
$0.86
$1.91
$1.25
$0.23
(n=93)
(n=56)
(n= 12)
(n=9)
Median - Challengers
$0.08
$0.18
.428
$0.15
$0.13
Mean - Challengers
$1.09
$0.97
$0.36
$0.51
(n=97)
(n=71)
(n=15)
(n=1 1)

p
.736

.377

.177

.979

The Ohio data also permit comparison with Allebaugh and Pinney's reported
increases in average expenditure per vote in Michigan. As shown in Table 8, Ohio
candidates overall also spent more per vote after term limits, although not in all races.
Only one increase is statistically significant, however: the almost 100% increase in
median expenditures per vote across all house races. This increase is even more
dramatic than Allebaugh and Pinney's reported 62% increase in average (rather than
median) cost per open primary vote in the Michigan House. 187 At the same time,
expenditures per vote in races involving senate incumbents (including their
challengers) and in house open primaries declined, although these results lack
statistical significance (and may also have been influenced by the peculiar
circumstances in the Ohio House in 1996 described above).

186. Another possible influence on 1996 house open races, with a particularly dramatic
effect on the mean but a noticeable impact on the median as well, is the presence of one
extremely expensive primary campaign among Democratic candidates. Larry Friedman, an
unsuccessful Democratic primary candidate for Ohio House District 11, reported $192,682 in
expenditures (apparently all his own money, as he reported $0 in contributions) during the 1996
primary. To overcome this outlay, his victorious opponent spent $49,700, more than twice the
average amount of $23,844 expended to win a competitive open house primary that year, before
going on to spend the much smaller sum of $28,000 to win the general election. If this race is
excluded as an anomalous outlier, expenditures for house open seats show a more substantial
increase between 1996 and 2000, but the change remains not statistically significant.
187. See Allebaugh & Pinney, supra note 113, at 171-72 tbl. 11.6.
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3. Partisan Variations in Expenditures and Contributions
Table 9
1996-2000 Ohio House & Senate Open Primary Expenditures by Political Party
House Candidates
1996
2000
% change
Median Republican Primary Expenditures
$7,390
$11,230
52%
Mean Republican Primary Expenditures
$11,368
$23,841
110%
(n=l l)
(n=81)
Median Democrat Primary Expenditures
$2,855
$2,268
-21%
Mean Democrat Primary Expenditures
$30,307
$4,824
-84%
(n=9)
(n=75)
Senate Candidates
1996
2000
% change
Median Republican Primary Expenditures
$3,346
$34,122
920%
Mean Republican Primary Expenditures
$7,213
$77,375
973%
(n=5)
(n=10)
Median Democrat Primary Expenditures
$10,519
$6,396
-39%
Mean Democrat Primary Expenditures
$9,856
$29,908
203%
(n=4)
(n=7)

p
.489

.464

p
.027

.571

Interesting results also emerge when we analyze expenditures and contributions
separately by political party. As previously reflected in Table 6, median expenditures
in open senate primaries for candidates of all parties rose 70% between 1996 and
2000. Yet as shown in Table 9, the increase in median expenditures in open
Republican primaries for a senate seat was much more dramatic, climbing from $3346
to $34,122. This increase among Republican candidates in open senate primaries was
statistically significant, even though the increase among candidates of all parties in
Table 6 was not. The median expenditure in an open Democratic senate primary
decreased, although the decrease was far from statistically significant.
Party differences in the possible impact of term limits were not as extreme in the
house. As in the senate, median expenditures rose for Republicans and declined for
Democrats after term limits, although these much more modest changes in the overall
pattern of expenditures in the house were not statistically significant for candidates of
either party. In contrast with the senate, Republican primary candidates generally
outspent Democratic primary candidates both before and after term limits.
Furthermore, in the 2000 election the difference between Republican and Democratic
house primary expenditures was highly significant (p = .000), showing that the
Republicans had established a clear advantage in the first election after term limits.
Table 10
1996-2000 Ohio House & Senate Open Primary Contributions
House Candidates
1996
2000
% change
Median Republican Primary Period Contrib.
$0
$7,412
N/A
Mean Republican Primary Period Contrib.
$1,605
$15,951
894%
(n=l1)
(n=81)
Median Democrat Primary Period Contrib.
$0
$3,084
N/A
Mean Democrat Primary Period Contrib.
$6,482
$5,045
-22%
(n--9)
(n=75)
Median Primary Period Contrib. (all cands.)
$0
$4,068
N/A
Mean Primary Period Contrib. (all cands.)
$3,619
$9,843
172%
(n=21)
(n=170)

p
.000

.158

.001
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Senate Candidates
Median Republican Primary Period Contrib.
Mean Republican Primary Period Contrib.
Median Democrat Primary Period Contrib.
Mean Democrat Primary Period Contrib.
Median Primary Period Contrib. (all cands.)
Mean Primary Period Contrib. (all cands.)

1996
$3,875
$13,974
(n=5)
$26,154
$22,702
(n=4)
$11,965
$17,853
(n=9)

2000
$31,983
$43,646
(n=10)
$17,550
$22,834
(n=7)
$10,953
$28,395
(n=21)

% change
725%
212%

p
.270

-33%
0.6%

1.0

-8%
59%

1.0

Not surprisingly, large expenditure variations by party are matched by large
variations in contributions by party, as shown in Table 10, although in this instance the
statistically significant results are on the house side, rather than in the senate.'8 For
instance, the median contributions received during the primary election by Republican
candidates for open Ohio House seats rose from $0 to $7412 between 1996 and 2000,
while the mean increased from $1605 to $15,951. The increase among Democratic
candidates was much smaller and not statistically significant. 189 As a result,
Republicans enjoyed a more than two-to-one primary fundraising advantage in 2000.
On the senate side, the median primary contribution to Republican candidates for open
seats rose from $3875 to $31,983, while the mean more than tripled from $13,974 to
$43,646. Among Democratic Senate candidates, the median dropped from $26,154 to
unchanged, resulting in an almost
$17,550, although the mean remained essentially
90
two-to-one Republican fundraising advantage.'
4. Early Money
One additional feature of the Ohio data, reflected in Chart 1 below, is a dramatic

188. These data exclude contributions in the category of contributions from "candidates
and campaign committees," as coded by Ohio Citizen Action. This exclusion is meant to make
comparisons of the data across years more meaningful, given that only after 1997 were
candidates required to include in their contributions reports personal funds spent on their
campaign. See supra note 167. An unfortunate side effect of this exclusion is that it also
excludes transfers from other candidate committees. Nevertheless, it permits the comparison
across years of contributions to candidates from a variety of other sources, including individual
donors, PACs, labor unions, unincorporated businesses, and party funds.
This change in the reporting requirements may explain the large number (sixty-four) of
house candidates who reported no contributions in 1996 (as evidenced by the zero medians in
all three house 1996 categories in Table 10). In other words, a number of 1996 house candidates
appear to have financed their primary races from their own funds (or from contributions below
the reporting requirement threshold). Furthermore, these sixty-four candidates do not appear to
have invested too heavily, as all but seven reported spending less than $5000 on their primary
campaign, and all but three less than $10,000. In fact, among the thirty most expensive primary
campaigns for either the Ohio House or Senate in either 1996, 1998, or 2000 (in which
expenditures ranged from almost $59,000 to more than $324,000), every candidate but one, see
supra note 186, reported receiving contributions of at least 65% of their total campaign
spending from sources other than "candidates and candidate committees."
189. General election contributions for both Republicans and Democrats running for the
house dropped by over 40%, further suggesting the increased importance of the primary
elections.
190. General election contributions increased by roughly the same amount for Republican
senate candidates, while falling 25% for Democrats.
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increase in the number 9and amount of contributions received in the earliest stages of
legislative campaigns.1 '

Chart 1
Ohio General Assembly Open Seat Candidates
Off- Year Campaign Contributions
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In this boxplot, the shaded boxes represent the interquartile range (the twenty-fifth
to seventy-fifth percentiles) of the data, while the T-whiskers extend above the boxes
1.5 times the length of the interquartile range (or to the highest data point, if less than
1.5 times). The median, represented by the white line visible in the middle of the box
on the right, is not apparent in the other three plots because it is zero. The asterisks
above the whiskers are more extreme values beyond 1.5 box lengths above the
interquartile range.
As the boxplot reflects, total contributions disclosed for 1995, the off-year
reporting period prior to the 1996 election year, were almost nonexistent among
candidates for open seats in the Ohio House, and relatively small in the Ohio Senate as
well. Specifically, only one house candidate, out of twenty-one, reported any
contributions at all in this pre-primary period. Meanwhile, the mean senate
contribution of $7884 in this period (the median, as noted above, was zero) reflected
only three candidates out of nine running for open seats who reported any contributions
in 1995. But in the 2000 race, approximately half of the 170 candidates for open house
seats reported contributions in their 1999 annual report, with a mean total contribution
of $5472 (and a median of zero and a maximum of over $96,000). On the senate side,
the mean was $43,378 (with a median of $14,312, and a maximum of over $180,000),
reflecting fourteen out of twenty-one open seat candidates who reported off-year
contributions.
These data are evidence of fairly dramatic developments in the financing of open
seat primaries. The norm now appears to be to raise a substantial amount of funds well

191. These data also exclude contributions in the category of contributions from
"candidates and campaign committees," as coded by Ohio Citizen Action. See supra note 167.
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before the primary season begins. And although senate candidates typically raise much
greater amounts than their house counterparts, the number of outliers on the house side
shows that even many house candidates in the era of term limits have apparently
tapped into some large sources of funds.

In short, term limits in Ohio were accompanied by a number of noteworthy, and
statistically significant, changes in political campaigns. Foremost among these are
increases in primary expenditures, particularly in expenditures for house incumbent
seats and senate open seats. On the house side, these increases have resulted in a
statistically significant doubling of the expenditures per primary vote. At the district
level, expenditures for house incumbent seats also have doubled, while expenditures
for senate open seats have increased fourfold. Republican expenditures for open senate
seats are up tenfold. Meanwhile, Republican candidates for open house seats have
experienced a dramatic increase in contributions, and typical open seat candidates have
begun building their campaign coffers much earlier. As a result, candidates seem to
continue to be as dependent as ever on finding and cultivating a network of financial
support.
Declining margins of victory reinforce the sense that the real competition for many
legislative seats increasingly occurs at the primary stage. This is a development that
may be precipitated at least in part by the presence of a large number of legislative
seats deemed "safe" for the dominant party of the district. 192 Whether term limits can
offer voters much additional "choice" in a context in which there are diminishing real
contests among the principal political parties is an important question. A separate but
related question of candidate choice to which we now turn involves who the new
representatives under legislative term limits are.
C. Cincinnatus:A ContemporaryMyth?
As noted earlier, an ostensible purpose of term limits was to populate legislatures
with a wider and more representative variety of individuals, popularly thought of as
"citizen legislators."'' 93 However, the continued escalation in campaign costs just
described could easily thwart this goal by discouraging the candidacies of viable
newcomers whom term limits otherwise might inspire to follow in the footsteps of
Cincinnatus.194 The extent to which term limits are delivering on their justification of
restoring a more amateur politics therefore deserves attention.
A few studies have begun to analyze the personnel changes occurring in termlimited legislatures. Although also still preliminary, these studies so far do not show
much change in the demographics of individuals elected. For instance, in one of the
first careful studies, Professors Carey, Niemi, and Powell found "no systematic
differences in the backgrounds of the legislators from term-limit and non-term-limit

192. The number of "safe" seats is primarily a result of legislative redistricting efforts. To
the extent that a seat is relatively safe for a particular party, it will be more attractive to
candidates from that party and thereby draw more primary level competition.
193. See supra notes 30, 67-72 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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states." 195 They derived their conclusions from a 1995 survey of state legislators and a
series of interviews in 1997 with legislators from California and Maine, where term
limits had already taken effect. The one demographic feature they found meriting
"special attention" was gender, with respect to which they found inconclusive but
suggestive evidence that term limits may have modestly helped women to "shore up the
gains" they had already made in the 1980s and early 1990s.196 Otherwise, they found
no notable demographic changes, and "marginal,
if not negligible" changes in the
97
ideological placement of legislators as well. 1
In contrast, a few observers have claimed that term limits have produced larger
changes in legislative composition. However, their focus is typically on two factors: (1)
a decrease in the number of legislators who self-identify their occupation as
"legislator," and (2) an increase in the number of legislators with business
backgrounds. 198 But the first trend, rather than reflecting any true change in the
background, ideology, or approach to politics of any term-limited legislators, instead
may reflect nothing more than these legislators' decisions not to claim politics as a
career in the face of the very climate-hostile to career politicians!--that produced
term limits. As for the second trend, it seems an open proposition whether an increase
in the number of legislators who claim ties to business means the legislature is
becoming more broadly representative or diverse (although some proponents of term
limits certainly may be pleased to have more legislators who are sensitive to the
concerns of the private sector). Rather, this second trend is consistent with other claims
that the greatest compositional effect of term limits is not to make legislatures
199 more
diverse or representative, but to make them more ideologically conservative.
Subsequent studies of the demographic effects have reached results generally
consistent with those of Professors Carey, Niemi, and Powell, except with less positive
stories about the effect of term limits on the representation of women. In a study of the
1998 election, Susan Carroll and Krista Jenkins found an actual decrease in the number
of seats held by women after term limits. 200 A 2001 report from the Center for
American Women and Politics at Rutgers University similarly found that in both 1998
and 2000 the number of women forced out of state house offices by term limits was
20
greater than the number of women elected to house seats opened up by term limits. 1

195. CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 24.
196. Id. at 24, 27. For a 1992 prediction that term limits would not result in any meaningful
demographic changes among legislators, with the possible exception of selective benefits for
women in some states, see Fowler, supra note 77, at 182.
197. CAREY ET AL., supranote 10, at 24, 34. The study did find "spotty" results suggesting
that term limits may have "mitigated the trend towards social conservatism among legislators
first elected in the 1992 and 1994 election cycles." Id. at 39.
198. See, e.g., Basham, supra note 101, at 11 (reporting Mark A. Petracca's data that the
percentage of self-described "legislators" among California Assembly freshmen dropped from
36% in 1986 to 3.4% in 1995, while the number of business people in the legislature tripled).
199. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, DViDED GOvERNMENT 57 (1996); Scott R. Meinke &Edward
B. Hasecke, Term Limits, Professionalization,andPartisanControl in U.S. State Legislatures,

65 J. POL. 898, 899 (2003).
200. Susan J. Carroll & Krista Jenkins, Do Term Limits Help Women Get Elected?, 82
Soc. Sct. Q. 197, 198-99 (2001); see also Robert A. Bernstein & Anita Chadha, The Effects of
Term Limits on Representation:Why So Few Women?, in THE TEST OFTME 147, 147-48 (Rick

Farmer et al. eds., 2003).
201. HAWKESWORTH & KI.EEMAN, supra note 10, at 8. Interestingly, these declines were
offset by women's victories in races against incumbents or for seats left open for reasons other
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The same report found that women candidates made gains in term-limited state senate
seats in 1998,202 but overall found no such gains in 2000.203
In Ohio, the effects of term limits on the representation of women were essentially
a wash. Term limits forced two women out of the state senate in 2000, while only one
woman was elected to a senate seat vacated because of term limits. 204 On the house
side, term limits forced twelve women
out of office, while fourteen women were
20 5
elected to seats opened by term limits.
Media accounts and anecdotal reports also tend to support the conclusion that term
limits have not introduced a new breed of citizen legislator. For instance, shortly after
Michigan's 1998 election, a newspaper reported that the group of newly elected state
representatives produced by the first round of term limits did not constitute the
promised "return to citizen lawmakers," but instead was comprised of experienced
politicians, legislative aides, and spouses of term-limited incumbents. 206 In turn, many
of the Michigan representatives forced out by term limits in 1998 chose,
unsurprisingly, to run for higher office, rather than return to their plows. 20 7 Likewise,
seven term-limited Ohio representatives chose to run for state senate, 2 0 and anecdotal
accounts suggest that many others sought other political offices. 2° 9 One Ohio legislator
lamented that term limits not only "force women and minorities out of office" while
doing nothing to recruit, encourage, and assist new women and minorities to run for
office, but also might in the long run decrease the pool of women prepared to seek
than the operation of a term-limit provision. See id. at 9.
202. The Hawkesworth & Kleeman study does not report the backgrounds of these women.
In particular, one plausible explanation is that many of them had been serving in the lower
house of their state legislature, and had decided to run for state senate because term limits forced
them out of their house seat.
203. See id. at 9-10. More specifically, in 2000 two states saw more women elected to
term-limited senate seats than were forced out, while four states saw more women forced out of
senate seats by term limits than were elected to open seats, and four states saw no change. See
id. at 10.
204. See id. at 9-10. Priscilla Mead, the one woman elected to an open Ohio Senate seat,
had previously served in the Ohio House until term limits forced her out. She resigned her
senate seat within the first year after taking office, explaining that "[tihis is an ideal place for
somebody who relishes caucus politics and savors the campaigns as they have come to be." Lee
Leonard, To All New Legislators:Leave Your Individual Thinking Caps at Home, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 2003, at 7A.

205. See HAwKEswoRTH & KLEEMAN, supra note 10, at 8. Although women thus made a
small gain in the Ohio House, three of these representatives took the seats of their term-limited
husbands. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, LegislatureSeats Sought by Spouses, AP ONLINE, Feb.
27, 2001, at 2001 WL 13677392.
206. Gary Heinlein, State House Rookies Boast Experience, DETRorr NEWS, Nov. 16,
1998, at IA.
207. See Limits Put Heaton Senate, THE GRAND RAPIDs PRESS, July 29, 1998, at X5, 1998

WL 12607268 ("This year's most spirited Senate primaries are the result of term-limited House
members challenging people within their own party.").
208. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Finan Says Term Limits Bring Unexpected Problems, THE HANNAH REP.
(Hannah News Serv., Columbus, OH), July 27, 1999, at 1 (reporting Ohio Senate President's
concern that before completing their final terms, term-limited legislators are accepting executive
appointments or begin "looking at becoming county commissioner, a judge or mayor");
Leonard, supra note 204, at 7A (reporting frustrated state Senator's description of colleagnes as
"fixated on their next opportunity, whether it's running for Congress, returning to the House or
becoming a county official").
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higher office.21°
The National Conference of State Legislatures 211 has also conducted an online
survey concerning term limits. As of shortly after the 2000 election, 150 respondents,
presumably mostly state legislators or staffers, had responded. Although not a
controlled sample and obviously subject to selection bias (for instance, 83% of
respondents indicated that they did not support term limits), 51% of respondents said
term limits had produced no change in the diversity of their legislature,
and an
212
additional 22% said their legislature was less diverse under term limits.
In sum, term limits do not yet appear to have produced much of their anticipated
reconstitution of the composition of state legislatures. So far, few "ordinary citizens"
have been drawn away from their plows. While supporters can plausibly argue that it is
too soon to determine what long-term reconstitution may yet occur, it is not too soon to
wonder why no signs of a trend have appeared. It is therefore important to consider
whether at least one factor in this dynamic may be the continuing upward spiral in the
expense of seeking elected office, even in races under term limits.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF TERM-LIMITED STATE LEGISLATORS

The preceding empirical data concerning changes in state legislative elections
accompanying the onset of term limits give rise to at least three categories of further
observations. First, several potential effects of term limits on the financing of political
campaigns merit more extended discussion. Next, these effects provide a new lens with
which to view the existing structures of legislative elections, and suggest some possible
reforms both in the area of campaign finance and in term limits themselves. Finally, it
is apparent that important questions remain for ongoing study, especially as more states
with legislative term limits begin to feel their direct effects, and those states
whose
213
term limits have already kicked in continue to gain additional experience.
A. Reflections on the Increases in Campaign Costs Under Term Limits
One implication of the data described in Part II is that term limits apparently have
210. McLin, supra note 10, at 539, 544-45.
211. The National Conference of State Legislatures is the pre-eminent organization
providing information, publications, research, conferences, seminars, and other services to the
nation's state legislatures, their members, and their staff. GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, at http://www.ncsl.org/public/guide.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2002).
212. See SURVEY
RESULTS:
NCSL's ONLINE TERM
LIMITS POLL,
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/survrslt.htm (last updated July 18, 2003).
213. At the outset, it is important to warn against overgeneralizing from the California,
Michigan, and Ohio data. State-to-state variations in legislative characteristics, such as the
professionalization of a state's legislature, the legislature's party balance, the length of the
state's term-limit period, or whether the term limit is a lifetime ban or a consecutive-years ban,
among other factors, may affect the impact of term limits on political campaigns. Each of the
three states studied in this Article has a highly professionalized legislature, as well as a termlimit period of no more than eight years (and six years in the case of the lower houses of the
California and Michigan legislatures). See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 tbl.l.1, 147-48.
The experiences of these states may be substantially different from the experiences of Nebraska,
Nevada, or Wyoming, for instance, where the legislatures are less professionalized, the term
limits period is as long as twelve years (Nevada and Wyoming), or the legislature is unicameral
(Nebraska). See id.
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done little to stop-and in some types of races may be contributing to-the continuing
growth in campaign spending, at least in states with professionalized legislatures. 214 in
particular, the Ohio data show an 80% increase in median expenditures per candidate
in primary elections for the General Assembly overall and a corresponding 54%
increase in primary races for the Ohio House, both statistically significant. 21 Among
candidates in contested house primary races the increase is 110%, a result that
approaches statistical significance. A similar but not statistically significant trend exists
among candidates for open senate seats. 216
The fact that these increases are per candidate (rather than per district, as in the
Michigan study) should be troubling if the purpose of term limits is to produce more
citizen legislators. Per district increases might merely reflect the presence of a greater
number of primary candidates, which would provide voters more choice. Per candidate
increases, however, mean that it now costs more to run for office, a reality that is likely
to discourage many citizen legislators.
Of course, increased campaign expenditures might not necessarily be antithetical
to the goal of fostering citizen legislators, if the expenditures reflected heightened
public interest and in turn produced greater citizen participation. However, as shown in
Table 8 above, the increased expenditures do not appear to be generating
corresponding increases in voter turnout. Rather, many candidates are now spending
more per vote than before, even as much as two times more in the case of house seats
overall, or open senate seats. 217
Furthermore, the contributions data clearly reveal a related development: the rapid
increase in the number and amount of pre-election year contributions reported by
nonincumbent candidates, as shown above in Chart 1. This notable post-term limits
phenomenon is only partially explained by the increased numbers of house members
moving to open senate seats, with their preexisting campaign committees. The
presence of a similar explosion in pre-election year contributions to candidates for
house races also confirms the anecdotal reports that other types of open seat candidates
also are forming increasingly early allegiances with supporters and contributors.2 18 The
result may be an even greater advantage for those open seat candidates who can
quickly tap into the existing political fundraising infrastructures,
candidates who once
219
again may not fit the profile of a citizen legislator.

214. As previously suggested, the more professional legislatures tend both to have shorter
term limits, see supra note 92, and to produce more of the traits deemed undesirable by term-

limits advocates, see supra notes 19-27, 71 and accompanying text.
215. See supra tbls.4-5. General election expenditures showed a much smaller, and not
statistically significant, increase. See supra tbl.4.
216. See supra tbl.6. Meanwhile, a statistically significant increase in district-level senate
open primary expenditures did occur. See supra tbl.7.
217. At the same time, average votes per candidate did increase slightly in the senate, from
60,179 in 1996 to 65,206 in 2000, while they declined in the House, from 21,864 to 20,219.
218. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
219. On this front, one silver lining in the Ohio data is that PAC contributors do not appear
to have increased their proportionate influence on legislative elections. On the contrary, while
the dollar values of total PAC contributions to candidates for open seats in the Ohio House of
Representatives and Senate increased substantially between 1996 and 2000, and dramatically so
for Republican candidates, the proportion of PAC contributions to total contributions remained
relatively unchanged for senate Republican candidates (33% in 1996 and 35% in 2000), and
actually declined for house Republicans, for house and senate Democrats, and for candidates
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Another interesting and statistically significant feature of the Ohio data is that
house incumbents now are spending more than twice as much on their primary
campaigns after term limits. 220 One explanation could be that, by foreclosing service
beyond a fourth term, term limits have altered the makeup of the house incumbent
population and produced a less entrenched or secure incumbency. "Younger"
incumbents as a group may in fact simply be more vulnerable than their pre-term limits
cohort. Or, some house incumbents now may feel more vulnerable because more
challengers are emerging in an effort to build name recognition for the election when
the incumbent is termed out.221 Another possibility is that because term limits may
create more opportunities for house incumbents to rise into leadership positions, first-,
second-, or third-term members may place a greater value on retaining their seats than
they would have before term limits. Alternatively, because they know that their house
days are numbered, incumbents may already have their eye on a larger prize, and may
be developing and testing the strength of their campaign apparatus. In any case,
expenditures by challengers of incumbents also have increased.222
It therefore seems unlikely that house incumbents are any less distracted from their
primary representative responsibilities by the pressures of fund raising. Even
incumbents who feel safe may continue aggressively to raise funds, whether to transfer
to other candidates, to build and refine their fundraising strength with an eye towards
higher office, or simply for their own war chest. 223 Rising expenditures by incumbents
seem to be the antithesis of what term limits sought to accomplish.
Also worthy of note is the scale of the increase in primary expenditures for Ohio
senate open seats. Although no statistically significant results emerged at the individual
candidate level (which may simply reflect the small number of candidates observed in
this analysis), at the district level a statistically significant increase of over 350%
occurred, as median open primary expenditures rose from $12,990 to $58,880.224
Furthermore, this increase in senate open races occurred even though not as many
candidates225
were competing for each of these seats as were competing for each house
open seat.
Upon analysis, one sensible explanation for the large increase on the senate side is
that a heavy proportion of these candidates are former house members seeking to move
up. Many of these house members are moving because term limits have forced them
out of the house, while some are moving because term limits have forced out the
overall in both houses.
220. See supra tbls.5, 7.
221. In the house, the proportion of contested primary races for seats held by an incumbent

in fact has increased slightly, from twenty contested races out of 169 primary elections in 1996,
to fifteen contests out of 100 primaries in 2000. In both years, large proportions (fourteen of
twenty in 1996 and nine of fifteen in 2000) of these contested primaries were opposite party
primaries, pitting two challengers against each other for the right to take on the incumbent in the
general election, while the remainder involved a direct primary challenge to the incumbent.
222. See supra tbl.5.

223. Many studies have suggested that the size of an incumbent's campaign account may
discourage challengers from entering the race. See Hogan, supra note 129, at 816-17, 827.
224. See supra tbl.7.

225. See supra tbl.1. Moreover, senate open seats appear to have become "safer" for the
incumbent party, given the much larger margins of victory in general elections for these seats in
2000. See supra tbl.3. That this safety did not draw more competition to the primary is
indicative of the continuing high threshold of financial support required to be a viable
candidate.
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previous senate incumbent and the house member believes now is the best opportunity
to move. In fact, of Ohio's seven open senate seats in 2000, six were filled by former
members of the Ohio House. 226 At one point, up to four additional house members had
been contemplating vying for these open seats in primary matches against other house
colleagues, 22728although in the end only one such contest occurred.228
Thus, although a key purpose of term limits was to get new blood into both
chambers of the legislature, these forced legislative retirements instead seem to be
complicating the difficulties that nontraditional politicians face in getting into the state
senate. 229 While the dynamic obviously may be different in states with lifetime term
limits, 23° (or in a state like Oklahoma, where the term limits restriction applies to
combined time in both chambers), states with a prohibition on a certain number of
consecutive years in a particular chamber 231 appear to have strengthened the role of the
lower chamber as a supplier of candidates for the upper chamber. 232 As a result,

226. See Lee Leonard, RepublicansGain One Seat In House, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov.
8, 2000, at D 1. Similarly, five term-limited members of the California Assembly captured one of
California's ten open senate seats in 1996. Compare Final California Election Returns
California Senate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at A24 (reporting winners of 1996 California
Senate races, and noting those races with an incumbent running) with California Secretary of
State, Candidates for State Senate, available at http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/
cand/senate.htm (last visited March 21, 2004) (reporting occupations of Senate candidates,
including seven winners formerly from the California Assembly, two of whom had not yet
served the maximum two terms under term limits); see also Angela Dire, Coloradoon Term
Limits, STATE LEGISLATURES, July-Aug. 1998, at 32, 32 (describing attempted migration of
term-limited Colorado legislators from state house to state senate (and vice versa) as
"perpetuat[ing] exactly what proponents of term limits wanted to prevent: powerful career
politicians").
Of course, the lower house has always served as a stepping stone to higher office. For
instance, in the four open seat races for the Ohio Senate in 1996, two former members of the
Ohio House were elected. But term limits are likely to strengthen this trend by forcing more
house members to find an alternative to their house service sooner. Meanwhile, some termlimited senators have opted to continue their political careers in the house. See infra note 232.
227. See Sandy Theis, State Rep. Amstutz Seeks State Sen. Drake'sSeat, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 14, 1999, at 5B.
228. Rep. Jim Buchy, a nine-term member of the house precluded from seeking reelection,
lost the 2000 Republican primary for the Senate 12th District to Rep. Jim Jordan, a three-term
member of the house, in what was the most expensive primary election in Ohio history. See Lee
Leonard, CapitalNotes: Senate Campaign Sets Spending Mark, COLuMBus DISPATCH, Apr. 18,
2000, at B5. Buchy spent almost $400,000, and Jordan spent just over $300,000. See id.
229. One potential silver lining to the increased presence of former house members in
senate races may be the potential to at least partially mitigate the predicted adverse effects of
term limits on institutional memory and the relative power of lobbyists and the executive
branch. Thus, as experienced legislators from a state's lower chamber take their accumulated
wisdom to the upper chamber, the notion of bicameralism may be acquiring a new kind of
value. See Cain & Levin, supra note 21, at 182.
230. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
231. In addition to Ohio, these states include Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana,
Maine, and South Dakota. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 tbl. 1.1.
232. Furthermore, to a much lesser extent term limits in these states may also have given
rise to a conduit flowing in the opposite direction. In Ohio, for instance, three state senators
forced out of office in 2000 successfully ran for seats in the state house. See Leonard, supra
note 226, at Dl. In addition, four term-limited state representatives saw their spouses take their
house seats. See Welsh-Huggins, supra note 205.
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campaigns for open seats in the upper chamber are witnessing greater pressure from
experienced lower house members, who typically bring with them not only a stable of
political supporters, an established network of fundraisers, and an understanding of
how to bring in donations, but also a sizeable balance in their campaign treasury from
their previous house campaign committees.
On the other hand, not every trend showed an increase in expenditures after term
limits. In particular, median primary expenditures by Ohio Senate incumbents and by
candidates for open seats in the Ohio House have both gone down in the first election
after term limits.233 Although neither result is statistically significant, both merit brief
comment.
Given the ready access to campaign contributions that incumbents typically
enjoy, 234 the decline in senate incumbent spending suggests that few of these office
holders felt seriously threatened. Indeed, none of the ten senate incumbents running in
2000 faced a primary challenger, while four of twelve senate incumbents faced a
primary challenger in 1996.235 Thus, with the arrival of term limits may have come a
reduction both in competition and in campaign spending in primary races involving
senate incumbents (although the reduction in expenditures is more than offset by
increases in primary spending among senate open seat candidates).236 On the one hand,
this may mean fewer opportunities for influence peddling. On the other hand, it may
mean that most state senators are effectively elected for eight years, with a
corresponding decline in their electoral accountability when they are up for reelection.
Meanwhile, the decline in house open primary expenditures suggests the
possibility that more citizen legislators have in fact been drawn to these races. Upon
closer examination, however, this seems not the best explanation. First, the 1996 house
election may not provide a good baseline, given that party control of the chamber was
at stake and may have inflated expenditures that year.237 Second, per candidate
expenditures in the 2000 house election may have been held down by the raw number
of seats suddenly opened by the onset of term limits that year, which may have diluted
each candidate's ability to raise funds, and also may have caused parties and
contributors to focus instead on the senate, or on just a few key house races. As the
impact of term limits is distributed more uniformly across elections, it is unlikely that
any single house election will again see as many open seat races as occurred in 2000.238

233. See supra tbls.5, 6.
234. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 30. However, another factor in the drop in
incumbent primary expenditures in the 2000 senate race may have been a sharp reduction in the
supply of campaign funds, as average primary period receipts by senate incumbents dropped
from over $51,000 in 1996 to under $20,000 in 2000, perhaps because potential contributors
instead focused their attention and support on the much more competitive open senate races that
year.

235. See supra note 176.
236. One explanation might be that the parties themselves now exercise greater control
over accession to the senate and recognize that desirable candidates might be discouraged from
seeking a senate seat if intraparty challenges in their sole opportunity for reelection were
commonplace. On the house side, where incumbents may have as many as three reelection
opportunities instead of one, parties may not be as willing to grant them the same sort of free
ride every time. In addition, primary races may continue to serve as something of a proving
ground for house incumbents, who generally are less seasoned than their senate counterparts.
237. See supra text accompanying note 186.
238. As a result, it is possible that in the 2000 election more "citizen legislators" were able
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Third, and in light of the preceding, the rise in senate open primary expenditures
(statistically significant at the district level and consistent, albeit not statistically
significant, at the individual candidate level) 239 may tell a more accurate story about
changes in open seat races. Furthermore, the Michigan and California studies
corroborate what happened in the Ohio Senate, rather than the House. Specifically, in
the first elections for vacancies created by their term limits measures, California saw a
44% increase in average contributions per open Assembly seat, 240 and Michigan
witnessed a 53% increase in average expenditures per open house primary.24 1 Taken
together, these data and the reports of candidates and other participants suggest not
only that the typical costs to capture an open seat remain high, but also that at least in
some states and chambers term limits may be driving these costs higher, and further
raising the demand for financial contributions.
Furthermore, the trend towards increasingly expensive open primaries appears to
have a heavy partisan tilt. Indeed, in Ohio the spending increases are overwhelmingly
attributable to Republican candidates. 242 Of course, one explanation for this trend
could be that the Republican Party has simply become much better than the
Democratic Party at soliciting political contributions. Another possibility, however, is
in
that in a term-limited era, campaign support gravitates more heavily to the party 243
power. In 2000, the Ohio legislature was solidly under Republican control.
Campaign supporters in such an environment face greatly diminished prospects that
supporting a Democratic candidate will pay off in the long run, either as a result of a
change in party control years down the road, or as a minority party legislator
nonetheless acquires clout over time. Contributors under term limits therefore have a
correspondingly diminished need to hedge their bets for the future by supporting
minority candidates. Instead, they may feel an increased need to identify and back a
winner early. 2 " One implication may be a decrease in competition in the general
election, where candidates from opposing parties are more likely to provide voters
meaningful choices concerning political ideas. The increasing margins of victory in
although not statistically
both house and senate general election open seat contests,
246
significant, 245 lend some support to this possibility.
to compete for seats in the Ohio House. It would remain to be seen, however, whether similar
opportunities would occur once term limits are affecting elections uniformly.
239. See supra tbls.6-7.
240. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
242. See supra tbl.9.
243. In 1999-2000, Republicans controlled twenty-one of thirty-three Ohio Senate seats
and fifty-nine of ninety-nine Ohio House seats (and all statewide elected offices, excluding
Supreme Court seats, were held by Republicans). See Gongwer Year-End Reportfor 2000,
Signs of Change in 2000 Broughton By Term Limits, Slowing Economy, Gongwer Ohio Report

No. 248, Vol. 69, at 1, 11 (Dec. 29, 2000).
244. Of course, it also is possible that for other reasons not attributable to term limits,
many institutional campaign contributors may be increasingly shortsighted and supportive
primarily of the party in power. For instance, anecdotal accounts indicate that some party
leaders are now insisting that contributors who wish to remain in that party's good graces not
contribute to the opposing party. See Jim VandeHei, GOP Monitoring Lobbyists' Politics,
WASH. POST, June 10, 2002, at AOl.
245. See supra tbls.2-3.
246. Yet a third explanation for the partisan tilt might be that as the power of incumbency
matters less and less under term limits, many campaign donors increasingly shift their allegiance
from long-term relationships with friendly politicians of all stripes to open-seat candidates from

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:427

On a related note, the Republican Speaker of the Ohio House described his
caucus's aggressive efforts to recruit and groom open seat candidates in the 2000
election. 247 This suggests a top-down approach to candidate selection, rather than the
grass-roots, bottom-up model envisioned by term-limits supporters. Moreover, it seems
likely that these favored candidates were selected by Republican leaders for their likemindedness, party loyalty, and electability, more than for their characteristics as
"citizen legislators."
In turn, the most successful candidate recruiters and fundraisers then will be best
positioned to become (or determine) the leaders in term-limited legislatures. 248 More
specifically, because term limits occasion much higher turnover among legislative
leaders at the same time that they deprive members of time to learn the political skills
of their colleagues, fundraising and recruiting efforts will become increasingly
important means for leadership candidates to prove their worth and develop a loyal
following among their caucus. 249 The resulting linkage between fundraising, on the one
hand, and setting and managing the legislative agenda, on the other, is antithetical to
one of the primary rationales for term limits, namely reducing the influence of special
interests. As a result, we might not be surprised by studies finding that ambitious career
politicians seem to continue to be drawn to term limited legislatures.25 °
All in all, those whose support for term limits grew out of a frustration that elected
representatives had lost touch with their constituents and grown complacent with the
security of their incumbency should have reason for some disappointment. Rather than
producing more directly responsive and accountable legislators, term limits appear
instead to be producing legislators who may be more beholden to financial contributors
than their predecessors. The increasing costs of campaigning for legislative office
create a substantial headwind for potential new or alternative types of candidates,
including "citizen legislators," who wish to run for office.2 5 ' Instead, term-limited seats
continue to be most easily claimed by those who can amass large campaign coffers,
and at an increasingly early stage.
The extent to which this is an indictment of term limits, however, may depend on
one's perspective on the legislative process and the role of legislators. Under the
"legislators as agents" model, embraced by Public Choice and some liberal interest
group theorists, there may be nothing wrong with a legislative body being most
the party perceived as most likely to protect their wealth.
247. See Householder, supranote 123, at 31 (describing GOP caucus role in recruiting and
supporting house candidates); see also Leonard, supranote 204, at 7A (quoting state senator's
frustration with pressure to raise funds for the party caucus).
248. See Rick Farmer, Lemonade from Lemons: Responding to Term Limits Via Party
Caucuses, SPECTRUM, Fall 2001, at 36.
249. See Leonard, supra note 204, at 7A (reporting one legislator's conclusion that "to
become a committee chair, you have to raise money for the caucus").
250. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 10, at 61. Of course, these individuals now must satisfy
their political ambition by moving to other offices, perhaps sooner than they otherwise would
have. Cain & Levin note that those who hoped term limits would thwart political ambition may
have been overly focused on the effect of static ambition (serving continuously in the same
office), while slighting the potential impact of progressive ambition (transferring political skills
to other offices). See Cain & Levin, supra note 21, at 176; see also Garrett, supra note 9. In
fact, according to some observers, term-limited legislators are more ambitious than their
predecessors. See Daniel M. Weintraub, The Trouble with Term Limits, STATE LEGISLATURES,
July-Aug. 2002, at 40, 41.
251. See MONCRIEF ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.
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responsive to those interest groups with the greatest clout.252 But under a Burkean
model, in which legislators are to act as trustees for their constituents, well-funded
special interests wielding disproportionate influence contaminate the legislative
process. 253 Most arguments in favor of term-limits seemed to build upon a Burkean
model rather than a Public Choice model.254
In contrast, while non-term-limited legislators may have been perceived as
somewhat aloof and disconnected from their constituents because of the relative safety
of their seats,255 they nonetheless may have been less influenced in their legislative
judgment by the pressures of fundraising than many term-limited legislators.
Moreover, some degree of electoral independence, in which representatives exercise
their accumulated wisdom on behalf of the public interest even contrary to the popular
256
passions of their constituents, is a respected component of representative democracy.
Undeniably, this independence is itself ripe for exploitation, and frustration that special
interests were effectively exploiting it was a key motivator for term limits. 257 But in
depriving constituents of the ability to decide at the voting booth whether their state
legislators continue to have their best interests at heart, term limits may be further
candidates'
estranging representatives from the average voter and increasing
258
dependence upon aggressive fundraising and special interests.
B. Possible Refinements to State Legislative CampaignProcesses
Term limits' apparent inability to reduce the impact of fundraising in legislative
elections, together with the opportunities this circumstance creates for special interests,
sheds some light on other aspects of state political campaigns. In particular, many
recent changes in state campaign finance laws may have done little to improve the
prospects for citizen legislators, and in some cases may exacerbate the difficulty of
broadening our democratic processes. That this difficulty persists even in states with
legislative term limits offers yet another reason to question the system created by
Buckley v. Valeo. However, two types of possible campaign reform within the Buckley
framework-public funding and private seed money---retain some potential to improve
campaigns for term-limited legislatures. In addition, the effects of term limits on
252. See GIERZYNSKI, supra note 36, at 13; DAvID B.
PROCESS: POLmcAL INTERESTS AND PUBUC OPINION (1951).

TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL

253. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECIVE ACTION (1971); ELMER E.
SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEw OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(1960).
254. See, e.g, WILL, supra note 30, at 99-101; CAREY Er AL., supra note 10, at 42.

255. See Basham, supra note 101, at 5-6.
256. This is what Hannah Pitkin has called the "trusteeship" model of democracy. See
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation,in REPRESENTATION (1967). However, it traces
its pedigree at least to the ideas of James Madison an4,Edmund Burke. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
10 (James Madison); Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors at Bristol, Nov. 3, 1774, in THE
FOUNDER'S CONSTrruTION (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987); see also

Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493-1723 (1988).
257. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
258. Professors Carey, Niemi, and Powell find some empirical support for the position that
term-limited legislators are less responsive to their constituents. See CAREY ET AL., supra note
10, at 58. At the same time, they describe one possible interpretation of this in terms of a

"Burkean detachment from narrow district concerns," which may facilitate greater attention to
the needs of the entire state. Id. at 62-63.
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campaign financing provide reasons to adjust or eliminate term limits themselves.
1. Problems with Existing Campaign Finance Regulations
Since 1993, when the movement to adopt legislative term limits had essentially
peaked, eleven states with term limits have enacted significant new campaign finance
reform measures. 259 Typically, these measures changed the state's contribution limits,
enhanced its disclosure requirements, or regulated the circumstances in which
candidates could receive contributions. 260 These reforms were generally proposed,
considered, and adopted independently from term limits, however, and their impacts
were not specifically coordinated with the anticipated effects of term limits on political
campaigns.261
Now that we have data about term limits' actual effects on legislative campaigns,
we can consider whether certain campaign finance reform efforts are better suited for a
term-limited environment. We can also explore whether some campaign finance
reforms in fact compound the reasons that term limits seem neither to enhance
candidate diversity nor to promote greater independence from campaign contributors.
In particular, contribution limits may work at cross purposes with term limits, despite
the fact that both are reform measures with a primary aim of reducing special interest
influence on government, and regardless of whether contribution limits may otherwise
be desirable.
For instance, as many analysts of campaign finance reform have argued, political
contribution limits may effectively operate as incumbent protection measures. 262
Because established politicians generally are better positioned than their opponents to
raise funds from a variety of donors, contribution limits add to the difficulties facing
challengers. Of course, in one respect term limits were intended to address exactly this
problem, by precluding incumbents from seeking reelection after the specified number
of terms. Yet term limits also may discourage challengers from taking on sitting
legislators during the intervening elections, before an incumbent is compelled to step
down, precisely because potential challengers know that they will have a much better
chance if they simply wait an election or two. 263 This is what seems to have happened
in the Ohio Senate, although the results are not statistically significant. Contribution
limits may only exacerbate this adverse effect on challenger emergence in intermediate

259. See Kenneth R. Mayer, CampaignFinance Reform in the States: A Report to the
Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, tbl.1 (1997), at

http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/-kmayer/commission.pdf.
260. See id.; MALBtN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 15-23. It also bears noting that state
contributions limits tend to be fairly large, as a proportion of median per candidate
expenditures. For instance, in Ohio an individual or a PAC may donate up to $2500 to a
candidate in the primary election, and apother $2500 in the general election. See OHIO REv.
CODE § 3517.102. In 2000, median primary expenditures per candidate for the Ohio General
Assembly were $3463. See supra tbl.4. The contribution limits therefore tend to have the most
impact on the targeted, hard-fought, and very expensive races that skew the mean expenditure
figures well above the median figures.
261. This is neither surprising nor blameworthy, given the inconsistent predictions about
how term limits would affect legislative races generally, and campaign financing in particular.
See supra notes 68-77, 105-17, and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 98.
263. See Fowler, supra note 77, at 184; supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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elections by supplying one more reason for potential candidates simply to wait until the
seat becomes open.
Furthermore, even where some incumbents appear to be facing stronger challenges
under term limits, as seems to have happened in the Ohio House, contributions limits
may continue to favor the incumbents. In particular, Ohio House incumbents showed a
statistically significant 109% increase in primary expenditures between 1996 and 2000,
and although this increase was matched by a yet larger (although not statistically
significant) percentage increase on the part of challengers, incumbents continued to
outspend challengers by more than ten-to-one. 264 As a result, incumbents were able to
remain in office at the same time that they became even more indebted to their
financial contributors, while contribution limits thwarted challengers from achieving
greater success.
Contribution limits may also have an adverse impact in races for open seats. Here,
ceilings on contributions may play a role in term limits' apparent effect of favoring
those newcomers able to generate substantial party and caucus support at (and even
before) the primary election stage. 265 If the costs of running for an open seat rise under
term limits, as they have in some chambers in some states,266 then candidates unable to
tap into a pre-existing network of traditional support will face even stiffer odds, unless
they can finance the bulk of their campaign either from their own personal funds, or
from one or two major donors. Contribution limits preclude the latter option, however,
and neither independently wealthy candidates nor those already plugged into
established political networks seem to be model examples of the citizen legislators that
term limits proponents promised.
Moreover, if term limits are not enhancing competition for open seats in general
elections, at least in some states or chambers, 26 7 then state legislatures may derive
greater benefits from vigorous competition among candidates at the primary election
stage. As more and more seats are deemed "safe" for one party or the other,268
meaningful intra-party competition may take on increasing importance as a means of
keeping parties accountable and introducing new perspectives into state politics. But
once again, contribution limits dampen the degree to which individuals with new or
alternative perspectives can freshen the debate or shift the agenda.269
Thus, political contribution limits may heighten term limits' inability to
reinvigorate our politics. Of course, the almost intractable difficulty of fostering the
candidacies of politicians who are independent of special interests is in significant part
attributable to the fact that, since Buckley, states have been unable to limit the amount
of money that candidates may spend on political races. 270 That even races for term-

264. See supra tbl.5.

265. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
266. The Ohio House is the notable exception, although as suggested this may reflect
idiosyncrasies unrelated to term limits or peculiar to their year of first effect. See supra notes
237-41 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
268. Redistricting (the redrawing of legislative district boundaries that typically occurs
every decade in response to the federal census) has tended to generate more and more "safe"
seats, as gerrymandering for partisan advantage becomes increasingly widespread and
sophisticated. See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 6.
269. See MA.LBIN & GAis, supra note 39, at 174 (summarizing research showing that
raising seed money is particularly difficult for political newcomers).
270. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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limited legislatures continue to be plagued by a number of high-stakes, high-spending
races provides an additional reason to wonder whether what is broken about our system
is not the power of incumbency per se, but rather the sacrosanct treatment of political
expenditures as pure speech under the Buckley decision. 27 If states could more
effectively limit total spending in political campaigns, the dynamic would be
272
completely different, particularly in open-seat races in term-limited states.
Term limits took hold when there seemed little prospect for a rollback of the
protections of political spending under Buckley. 273 Indeed, had states been able to
impose greater controls or limits on candidates' political expenditures, it seems open to
question whether the term limits movement would ever have materialized.274 However,
in the last several years the Supreme Court has seemed less enamored of its 1976
Buckley decision, culminating in late 2003 with the Court's approval of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act. 275 In addition, individual members of the Court have shown

increasing discomfort with the Buckley notion that campaign spending is pure political
speech. 276 In no small part this discomfort may be driven by ongoing concerns about
the impact of wealthy contributors on campaigns for federal office, notwithstanding
fairly low contribution limits and twenty-five years of efforts to refine federal
campaign finance law. To these concerns the term limits experiment adds a new layer
of understanding from the state level: not even kicking all legislators out after six or
eight years has succeeded in bringing in fresh representatives who are free from the
grip of special interests and untainted by the pressures to raise exorbitant sums of
campaign cash. Coupled with a variety of existing doubts about the way in which the
Buckley Court struck the balance between protecting speech and protecting the
processes of democracy, 277 the failure of term limits to generate greater independence
from well-funded special interests could provide an additional reason to seek to
jettison the Buckley framework.

271. In turn, the inability to limit candidate expenditures creates one of the most powerful
advantages for an incumbent, the ability to outspend (by outfundraising) one's challenger.
272. Of course, in non-term-limited states as well, campaigns would likely be fairly

different if political spending were treated as something other than pure speech protected by the
First Amendment.
273. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
275. See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
276. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003) (upholding federal regulation of
corporate political activity as applied to nonprofit advocacy corporation); FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (rejecting facial challenge to federal
limits on political parties' expenditures coordinated with a candidate); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Money is property; it is not
speech."); Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the
End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1729 (2001) (arguing that many members of the
Court are searching for alternatives to the Buckley framework).
277. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 49; see also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-PerVoter: A ConstitutionalPrincipleof Campaign Finance,94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1212 n.28
(1994) ("Buckley is even worse than Lochner [because it] makes the even greater mistake of
preventing democratic processes from reforming themselves...."); Cass R. Sunstein, Political
Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1397-99 (1994) (also
comparing Buckley to Lochner); Gene R. Nichol, Money, Equality and the Regulation of
Campaign Finance,6 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1989).
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2. Two Alternative Campaign Finance Reforms

Until a change occurs at the national level in the constitutional limits of campaign
finance laws, individual states retain several other options for responding to the impact
of term limits. Taking at face value the justification that term limits were intended to
help purify our politics, two campaign reforms have the greatest potential to salvage
the term limits experiment. Direct public funding of candidates 278 is one option that
could enhance the prospects that term limits will produce a more diverse group of
elected officials with increased independence from monied special interests. Another
option, perhaps counterintuitive, would be to revise the campaign contribution laws to
permit even larger private contributions, but only as seed money in the early stages of a
campaign.
In theory, the notion that the public would help bear the financial cost of fostering
and sustaining a robust political dialogue among a variety of candidates is attractive
simply as a matter of civic virtue, if not also as a means of both increasing electoral
competition and reducing the influence of special interests. 279 At least five states have
280
already implemented some form of public funding of their state legislative elections.
Although careful analysis in two of these states has not yet found evidence of closer
races against incumbents, 281 the unanswered question is whether public funding in
conjunction with term limits would significantly boost the initially modest effects of
term limits on increased competition for open seats. 282 We would expect public
funding coupled with term limits to allow more candidates to compete for seats in state
legislatures. In particular, to the extent that term limits create opportunities that a
number of potential candidates avoid pursuing because of the discouraging realities of
financing a viable campaign, public funding would help overcome this entry barrier,
especially for open seats.
In practice, however, successful public funding to enhance the impact of term
limits faces several hurdles, given that to overcome the power of established
fundraising machines, political newcomers most need public funding in the very early
stages of a race. At that point, identifying qualified candidates would be more difficult,
and the costs of public funding would be more expensive given the greater number of
278. The term "public funding" is sometimes also used to describe a variety of other statefunded efforts intended to enhance political campaigns, such as preparing voter guides,
distributing public money to political parties, or providing candidates with free air time. In this
discussion, the term is used to refer only to the variety of ways in which states may provide
campaign funds directly to candidates.
279. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 32. Unfortunately, popular support for public
funding has been dropping over time. See MALBiN & GAIs, supra note 39, at 65-70.
280. See MALBIN & GAIs, supra note 39, at 58 tbl.4-4 (identifying Hawaii, Minnesota,
Nebraska, and Wisconsin as states that provide public funding for legislative races); id. at 162
(describing Maine's public funding program). A number of additional states also provide some

form of public funding for their gubernatorial and other statewide races. See id. at 57 tbl.4-4.
281. See id. at 136-37 (describing study of Minnesota and Wisconsin).
282. See supra tbl. 1 and accompanying text. Only two states-Maine and Nebraska-have
both legislative term limits and a system of public funding for legislative elections. Compare
MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 22-23, 56, 60 (discussing states with public funding), with

supra note 1 (listing states with legislative term limits). Nebraska's term limits measure does not
displace members of its state legislature until 2008, see supra note 89, however, and its
unicameral legislature makes it ill-suited as a test for the remaining states. Maine thus provides
the obvious future case study with respect to this issue.
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candidates. Current public funding programs typically do not award funds to
candidates until they have raised a specified amount of funds (in the form of many
individual donations each of no more than a certain, relatively small, amount) on their
own. 28 3 Such eligibility requirements make complete sense from the state's standpoint
of not wanting, or being able to afford, to support the campaigns of just anyone who
would like to experience politics. On the other hand, these requirements prevent public
funding from functioning as seed money and assisting candidates when they most need
the help, as previously described.&4
In fact, one of the fundamental purposes of public funding programs today is not
to help fund political campaigns or assist newcomers, but to create a constitutionally
permissible basis to limit the amount of money that candidates can spend on their
campaigns.285 A candidate's voluntary agreement not to spend more than a set amount
becomes the key criterion for receiving public money.286 Some states have taken an
even more creative approach. If all candidates in a race agree to spending limits, none
will receive public funds, but if one candidate refuses to adhere to the spending limits,
the state then will fund the opponents' campaigns in an amount equal to the
expenditures of the candidate who exceeds the spending limits. 287 Of course, the
primary point of programs like these is not to invest public money in the political
process, but to use the threat of doing so to alter candidate behavior. 288
In contrast, for public funding to make a meaningful difference in the willingness
and ability of nontraditional candidates to compete for seats in term-limited
legislatures, the state would need to invest a much larger amount into financing
political campaigns. In today's economic climate, that presents a difficult hurdle.289 In
addition, public willingness to share the financial costs of our political dialogue has in
fact been declining over time. 29 Moreover, even were a state prepared to make the
investment required, it then would need to develop some criteria other than the
candidate's demonstrated fundraising ability-perhaps petition signatures 291-to
determine eligibility for early public funding. The state also would need to determine a
reasonable seed grant amount to give to eligible candidates, and decide whether and
how to distribute additional funds beyond the seed grant. Resolving these
283. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 56-59. Thereafter, in some programs eligible
candidates receive matching funds equal to the amounts they have raised privately, while in
other programs candidates receive a grant according to a formula. See id.
284. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
285. See GIERZYNSKI, supranote 36, at 44-45. In contrast, for a vigorous defense of public
funding of campaigns on the theory that "the costs of running for office [should be] a public
responsibility," see Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 32, at 1166-67.
286. See MALBIN & GAIs, supra note 39, at 60.
287. See id. (describing Nebraska and Florida provisions).
288. See id. at 55.
289. Most states are in the midst of one of their worst fiscal crises. See Robert Tanner,
State Legislatures Set to Tackle Budgets, AP ONLINE, Jan. 1, 2003, at 2003 WL 2922671;
Princeton Survey Research Assocs., Inc., The Pew Center on the States, State Legislators
Survey: A Report on the Findings 3-6 (2003), at http://www.stateline.org/specialreport/Pew
%20State%20Legislators%20%238288.pdf (reporting 2003 survey of state legislators predicting
"major belt tightening" in many areas in next two years).
290. See MALBIN & GAls, supra note 39, at 65-70.
291. This criterion also may be problematic as a barrier to entry for less traditional
candidates, given that the point of seed money is to provide them the opportunity to build the
support that ostensibly would already be evident by petition signatures.
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implementation issues also would not be easy, even assuming states decided they were
willing to make this type of significant additional public investment in our civic
dialogue.
As an alternative, states instead might consider selectively eliminating contribution
limits. Barring a wholesale revision of the Buckley framework, the fundamental
question regarding the value of contribution limits remains whether they more than
make up for their adverse effects by reducing the extent to which elected officials are,
or appear to be, beholden to large campaign contributors, who seek to manipulate the
political agenda for their narrow self-interests rather than the public good. This is an
immense and difficult issue at the center of many of the ongoing debates about
campaign finance reform. It also is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the
prospect that limits on political contributions may compound certain adverse effects of
legislative term limits instead prompts consideration here of the much narrower issue
of the impact of contribution limits solely on the primary campaigns of new and less
traditional candidates for term-limited legislatures.
To bring this specific issue into focus, consider the impact of removing
contribution limits entirely, but only with respect to non-incumbent candidates,
whether they are taking on an incumbent or competing against each other in open seats.
If challengers of incumbents could raise campaign funds without limits, prospects
likely would increase for genuine contests in incumbent races,292 even in a term-limited
environment in which challengers could choose simply to opt out until the next
election. 293 Similarly, permitting open-seat candidates to campaign without
contribution limits also would make it easier for independent or less traditional
candidates to be heard, provided they had even just one deep pocket with which to
start.294 So long as their increased ability to reach the public did not drown out other
voices, the result would be to increase the range of perspectives and ideas vying for
public support, compared to the narrower spectrum of viewpoints that existing
campaign processes typically generate from among
those candidates who can
295
successfully raise funds from many small donors.
Permitting unlimited political contributions may at first seem antithetical to
reducing the influence of wealthy special interests, and indeed is fraught with genuine

292. The idea that challengers ought to have additional financial resources to compensate
for the many advantages of incumbency is not a new one. For instance, a quarter century ago,
long before term limits took hold, U.S. Senator Alan Cranston proposed the idea of giving
additional funds to challengers as a way to promote more vigorous political competition and
keep politics fresh. See Limit a Lawmaker's Term in Congress?NO-"Compulsory retirement
is a waste of talent and know-how", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1978, at 71; see also
SORAUF, supra note 31, at 177-79.
293. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
294. For instance, the Center for American Women and Politics has described the need for
more effective fund-raising mechanisms (among other forms of support) for potential women
candidates if they are to overcome their hesitation to seize the opportunities created by term
limits. See HAWKESWORTH & KLEEMAN, supra note 10, at 15-16, 19.
295. To some, of course, a candidate's ability to raise funds is taken as a meaningful proxy
for the candidate's public support. In contrast, the argument here is that fundraising strength is a
heavily distorted measure of public support, and that both campaign finance reform efforts and
term limits share a similar view that a reinvigorated politics should invite more inclusive
participation and debate among candidates who may not immediately appeal to typical sources
of political money.
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risks. Not only might candidates be more beholden to their patrons, but the infusion of
new financing might also escalate campaign expenditures even further. Yet both of
these risks could be at least partially controlled, to the extent that state legislative
elections might well be improved by allowing unlimited contributions for certain
categories of candidates, particularly contributions as seed money for those who do not
begin a campaign with the support of established political elites.29
For instance, campaign finance laws could be restructured to allow candidates for
state senate to raise up to perhaps the first $30,000 from any single permissible patron
or combination of patrons, and likewise to allow candidates for state representative to
raise up to $15,000 this way. 2 97 Alternatively, the size of any individual contribution
could still be limited, but at a higher dollar amount up to the first $15,000 or $30,000
of seed money raised. By imposing a ceiling on the amount of unlimited contributions,
the risk of drowning out other voices would be greatly reduced. Instead, the primary
result of this seed money exception would simply be to allow additional candidates to
be competitive in the earliest stages of a race. A ceiling also should minimize any
escalation in overall campaign expenditures, because once the seed money is spent,
candidates will continue to have to rely on a number of small donations. Accordingly,
the seed money amount would need to be set carefully, so that it is high enough to
allow candidates of substance to take the steps necessary to begin to generate electoral
interest, but not so high as to free those candidates of the need to quickly and
substantially broaden their base of financial support in order to win the election.298
In addition, a seed money exception could be limited to a several-month period in
advance of the primary election. If coupled with rigorous requirements for early,
prompt, and full disclosure of seed money donors, this time frame should provide the
electorate a much greater opportunity to understand the source of the seed money and
to consider the risks that the candidate will not be independent of the patron(s). A party
choosing in its primary election a candidate unable to demonstrate sufficient
independence from a substantial patron might face the risk of seeing those ties become
an issue in the general election.
The Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform of the Citizens' Research
Foundation 299 has previously made a similar proposal (with higher dollar values) for

296. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 174-75.

297. These dollar values are simply illustrative. Appropriate amounts would vary widely
from state to state, just as average campaign expenditures do, depending on both district size
and the state's political history and traditions.
298. This ideal figure of course would vary from state to state, and even from election to
election. Fortunately, the practical success of such a seed money system would not require
identifying or employing the perfect ideal, but only reasonably approximating the resource
needs of typical newcomers trying to break into the political field. As with efforts to determine
where to set the dollar value of standard political contribution limits, states could experiment
with particular figures, seeing how they work and revising them over time. Furthermore, setting
this figure would not be any more difficult than deciding how much seed money to award
individual candidates under a system of public funding.
299. The Citizens' Research Foundation is "the nation's oldest non-partisan,
non-profit research center committed to public understanding of political
finance."
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federal elections. 300 The Task Force's proposal would in theory permit all candidates to
enjoy the higher initial contribution limits, but would count towards the seed money
amount all funds carried over from previous races. By including carry-over funds, this
proposal would effectively neutralize its benefit for typical incumbents, who retain
sizable bank accounts from previous races. Political newcomers thus would be the
principal beneficiaries of a system allowing unlimited contributions up to the seed
money threshold.
As noted, one trade-off for this significant increase in the ability of new candidates
to make an early impression and thereby begin to build a real following would be a
greater risk that elected officials would be in the pocket of their initial patron(s). 30 1 Yet
a substantial majority of those new candidates who would benefit from a seed money
exception would not win even their primary elections. These candidates therefore
would not be in a position to have their public duties unduly influenced by the support
of their patrons. Nevertheless, the enhanced profiles of even these unsuccessful
candidates, made possible through a seed money exception, should in themselves
broaden and improve the political debate.
Of course, in a term-limited environment the greater number of open seats will
increase the likelihood that newcomers helped by a seed money exception will win at
least some legislative elections. For these winners, concern about their relationships
with wealthy patrons, and the possibility that these patrons may receive special
treatment, would remain a real issue. Early, prompt, and full disclosure therefore
would be critical to the viability of this proposal. But as Malbin and Gais have
observed, by structuring a seed money exception to benefit only newcomers, most of
whom would ultimately still lose, "[t]he potential danger from high contributions
therefore seems manageable, particularly if they are limited to the campaign's earliest
days, when an 3opponent
will have plenty of time to disclose and make a campaign
02
issue of them."
In short, selectively eliminating political contribution limits has real potential to
overcome the significant entry barrier that existing campaign finance realities continue
to pose even to candidates for seats in term-limited legislatures. In contrast to public
funding, a "seed money" exception to campaign contribution limits has the distinct
advantage of not requiring a significant investment of public funds. 30 3 Its trickiest
implementation issue would be determining the appropriate ceiling on seed money
contributions, just as a system of public funding would also require the similar
determination of how much public money to distribute to candidates. 3°4 Furthermore, a
private seed money system, unlike public funding, would not impose on states the
difficult task of developing neutral eligibility requirements, independent of fundraising
ability, to determine who will receive public support, nor would it require the state to
administer and oversee a complicated program. Instead, its success would depend
largely on having and enforcing an adequate system of public disclosure requirements

300. See Citizens' Research Foundation, New Realities,New Thinking:Report of the Task
Force on Campaign Finance Reform 12 (1997); see also MALBIN & GAis, supra note 39, at
175-76.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 295-96.
302. MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 39, at 175.
303. Cf.id. (describing as "foolhardy" the idea that states would support public funding at
the level required to provide adequate seed money for newcomers).
304. See supra text accompanying note 291.
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concerning the sources and amounts of the seed money contributions. In exchange, a
much wider variety of candidates would likely be drawn to the public service
opportunities available in term-limited legislatures.
3. Potential Adjustments to Term Limits Measures
Revisions to state campaign finance regulations are not the only possible
responses to the adverse effects of term limits on campaign costs. Another set of
potential adjustments would involve refining the term limits measures themselves. For
instance, term limits of longer duration might act as less of an accelerant on open seat
campaign costs, while lifetime (rather than consecutive years) term limits might be
more likely to broaden the political class. However, given that the extant legislative
term limits measures in every state but one are provisions in state constitutions, the
3 5
prospects for these sorts of fine-tuning by constitutional amendment seem remote. 0
Nevertheless, in many states with six- or eight-year term limits (as in California,
Michigan, and Ohio), a number of people already have called for the extension of these
limits to at least twelve or sixteen years. 3 6 Although generally motivated by a desire to
enhance the legislature's institutional memory and to defer the transaction costs of
having the entire legislature turn over more often, longer term limits might also even
out some of the adverse effects on campaign competition and costs described above.
While it also is possible that merely extending the duration of the limits would not be
enough to counteract these adverse effects, we can postulate some reasons why it might
be worth exploring this kind of adjustment.
For instance, the longer the term limit period, the more likely challengers may be
to take on incumbents, perhaps especially in the upper chamber, rather than waiting for
their terms to expire. 30 7 Although this healthy increase in competition in incumbent
races would also be likely to increase expenditures in these races, one corresponding
result might be a reduction in spending for the generally more expensive contests for
open seats. Furthermore, even though open seat races would occur less often,
candidates might place less of a premium on them than under a shorter term limits
measure, in part because these races would be less perceived as the only good
opportunity to become a legislator. 308 If so, longer term limits might reduce the
expense required in any given open race, and permit more candidates to be
competitive. In addition, members allowed to serve a longer period in a state's lower

305. Of the sixteen states presently having legislative term limits, only Maine has a
statutory term limits measure that the legislature could change, as the legislatures in Idaho and
Utah have already done. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
306. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Term Limits Legislation, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/legislation.htm (last modified Oct. 21, 2002)
(summarizing legislative proposals to modify state term limits provisions).
307. As previously described, many state senators up for their sole re-election may be
getting something of a free ride under term limits that allow them to serve only two terms. See
supra note 236.
308. On the other hand, longer term limits might simply give ambitious newcomers that
much more time to prepare to capitalize on the anticipated opening of a seat, to groom
supporters, and to amass a campaign fund. Accordingly, the operation of term limits measures of
longer than eight years also merits careful study. To date, however, the effective dates have not
yet arrived in any of the three states (Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) with twelve-year
term limits.
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chamber might be more content to return to their plows when their terms expire, rather
than dominate open races for the upper chamber,
thus further softening the expenditure
39
increases seen in races for open senate seats. 0
Similarly, we might also see different effects, particularly on legislative
composition, 310 depending on whether a state's term limits measure is a lifetime ban or
a consecutive-years ban. As previously suggested, a consecutive-years measure may
give rise to a partially closed political class in which many of the same individuals
rotate from one office to another, perhaps even returning to their office of origin
eventually. 31' By precluding this possibility, a lifetime term limit measure, especially312
if
in the form of a lifetime limit on combined years of service in either chamber,
should generate more opportunities to bring in new members to both chambers and
broaden the class of elected representatives. In addition, a lifetime limit might be more
effective than a consecutive years limit at reducing the impact of political ambition on
legislative candidates. 313 On the other hand, one clear and perhaps unwelcome tradeoff for such a measure would be a much greater loss of institutional memory and
experience.314

Another option, of course, would be to repeal term limits in their entirety. In most
states, this also may not be a politically feasible option at present, given continuing
public support for term limits. However, this option may become increasingly likely as
experience with term limits grows. Indeed, not only may the public continue to be
disappointed by the impact of term limits on campaigns, but they may also become
increasingly frustrated by the actual performance of term-limited legislatures in
accomplishing legislative work. 315 This is one of many interesting issues that merit
future analysis, as it is still quite early to discern the extent to which term-limited
legislatures may systematically have greater difficulty conducting the people's

309. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text. Preliminary data also suggest that
term limits increase the likelihood that lower house members will pursue a seat in the upper
chamber. See CAEY Er AL., supra note 10, at 102-07, 127. The trend is sharper among
legislative leaders, who are five times more likely to seek a position in the other chamber than
are legislative leaders in non-term-limited states. See Thomas H. Little et al., State Legislative
Leaders' Careers,SPECTRUM, Winter 2001, at 1, 3.
310. Although the specific effects on campaign costs also may differ depending on whether
term limits are for lifetime or consecutive years, the data from California and Michigan (which
have lifetime limits) suggest that at least in the short-run lifetime measures also are associated
with substantial increases in campaign costs. See infra Part II.A.2.
311. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
312. Only Oklahoma presently has such a measure, limiting an individual to twelve years
in either chamber of the state legislature. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. It is also possible, however, that even
legislatures with lifetime term limits will remain highly attractive stepping stones for politicians
with progressive ambitions, who will simply have to adjust the timetable for their political
careers in light of term limits.
314. See supra note 229.
315. For example, some observers attribute California's recent repeated budget crises in
part to its legislative term limits, which in conjunction with the restrictions of several ballot
initiatives have produced "a state that is virtually ungovernable." John M. Broder & Dean E.
Murphy, A Recall Vote Seems Certain For California, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 2003, at Al;
Howard Fineman & Karen Breslau, State of Siege, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 26, 31
(describing California's term-limited legislature as composed of representatives "who often,
quite literally, don't know what they are doing" and who cannot produce a budget).
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C. Additional Questions Deserving FurtherStudy
The available data concerning legislative term limits' impact on candidates and
campaigns provides reason to believe that term limits do not take the place of
meaningful campaign finance reform, either as a means of removing a barrier to entry
on our political processes, or as a way to limit the political influence of well-financed
special interests. Nevertheless, these implications are still tentative, and the extent to
which term limits have systematically altered state legislative campaigns may not yet
be settled. Over the long-term, the effects of term limits may well change as our
political culture reacts and evolves. Accordingly, the impact of term limits merits
sustained study. Furthermore, the tentative conclusions presented here give rise to
additional questions.
One set of questions concerns the impact of term limits on legislatures with
important characteristics different from those of California, Michigan, and Ohio. In
particular, one question is whether term limits may have a more favorable impact on
campaigns in states with less professionalized legislatures. In these typically smaller
states, the barriers to entry, in the form of the ordinary costs of campaigning, may
already be naturally lower.316 Are term limits in these states bringing in more new
candidates, without exacerbating campaign expenses? Similarly, how does having a
unicameral317 legislature alter the effect of term limits on progressive political
ambition?
In addition, a number of interesting questions remain to be studied in the larger,
more professionalized states. Do candidates for term-limited legislatures raise or spend
their campaign funds any differently, such as in more grass-roots efforts, or with
increased reliance on transfers of funds between candidates? How do variations in a
state's campaign finance regulations alter the effect of term limits? What correlation is
there between candidates' personal wealth and the strength of their candidacies under
term limits? How do interest groups adjust or target their contribution strategies under
term limits? 31 8 Do term limits increase or decrease the number of citizens who make
political contributions or vote? 319 What is the impact of term limits on third party
candidates? And, as suggested above, do longer term limits reduce any adverse effects
on campaign costs, and how much difference does it make over the long run whether32a0
state has a lifetime term limit measure, rather than only a consecutive-years limit?
Campaign finance data from term-limited legislatures also could be analyzed using

316. As a result, less professionalized legislatures may already draw a different crosssection of citizens to serve as elected representatives, before controlling for the effect of term
limits. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 250. Although Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral legislature,
this feature in contrast with that of other legislatures can help shed light on the nature of
progressive political ambition.
318. In particular, are their contributions spread among more candidates, as George Will
predicted, see supra note 101 and accompanying text, or are they concentrated on key races and
particular candidates?
319. One analysis has found that term limits had a "significant and substantial negative
impact on voter turnout." ProfessionalPapers: Term Limits, SPECTRuM, Fall 2001, at 39
(summarizing recent Allebaugh & Pinney study).
320. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
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several additional controls. These might include the previous competitiveness of each
district, as measured by margins of victory; the prior political experience of candidates
for open seats; and whether an incumbent has voluntarily departed a term-limited seat
before the full term expires. In analyzing incumbent races, the number of terms that the
incumbent has served might also be a factor affecting expenditures. 321 Other potential
controls could include changes in the partisanship of a legislature, or in its districts,
with whatever perceived "safeness" may result for particular seats and parties.
Finally, it will be useful to track the impact of term limits on campaign funding
over the longer term. After several states have experienced several cycles under term
limits, we will be better positioned to compare trends in races for term-limited
legislatures with broader trends in campaign finance and changes in the costs of
campaigning. In addition to controlling for developments in campaign law (including
redistricting) that are more likely to occur over time, a longer-term study should also
try to control for changes in political attitudes and civic engagement generally.
CONCLUSION

While a number of questions about the impact of term limits on legislative
campaigns merit further study, the consistent trends across several states provide
reason to draw some tentative conclusions. Previous studies have shown that state
legislative term limits do not seem to have fostered the candidacies of a more diverse
group of citizen lawmakers. This static nature of the field of candidates may in large
part reflect the continuing financial demands of competing for elected office. This
Article's study of legislative elections in Ohio adds greater detail to the results of
earlier studies in California and Michigan that term limits seem to have done little to
break the close connection between financial support and campaigning for public
office, or to weaken the opportunities for special interests to influence elected officials.
On the contrary, candidates spent significantly more, on average, in primary contests
after term limits than before them, and reliance on early campaign contributions seems
to have jumped substantially.
To some term limits supporters, these conclusions may matter little. For instance,
some still may value term limits on the theory that they remove politicians who have
progressively lost touch with their electoral roots, while others may value term limits
for producing a state legislature less eager to see a role for government in responding
to society's needs. 322 But in the rhetoric of many of their boosters, and certainly in the

321. Incumbents may face more serious competition in their early terms, when the
advantage of their incumbency is weaker, and the opportunity cost to challengers of waiting
until the incumbents are termed out is greatest. See Cain & Levin, supra note 21, at 174-75;
Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 9, at 492, 510. Although this could generally be true in the termlimited context as well, term limits alternatively might encourage candidates to challenge
incumbents in their final re-election contests, as a way of staking out the territory in anticipation
of the subsequent election when the seat is open. See DANIEL & LOTT, supra note 98, at 169.

322. Indeed, some skeptics all along have seen most public justifications of term limits as
disguising a hidden motive, namely moving legislatures to the ideological right. See supra note
104. Although it would be an oversimplification to ascribe this view to all term limits
supporters, the term limits movement had a clear undercurrent of driving from power those
politicians (especially Democrats) who were inclined to rely more heavily on government
powers and programs. See CAREY Er AL., supra note 10, at 19; Thomas B. Edsall, ScandalFanningWon't Do It for the Republicans,WASH. POST, May 1, 1994, at C3.
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mind of much of the public who supported them, term limits were meant to help purify
our politics and serve as an antidote to the power of special interests. To these people,
term limits held out a hope of breaking the stranglehold that narrow interest group
influence seemed to have on politics.
The power of special interests is a power inextricably linked to election processes
and campaign fundraising practices. These processes and practices are the result of a
complex interplay of statutory and constitutional principles, and of the legislative and
judicial branches of government that produce and analyze these legal structures. In
turn, these structures are subject to revision in light of reason and experience. The
disappointing performance of term limits to date, in doing so little to purify legislative
politics and reform a system viewed as broken, ought to prompt careful reconsideration
of some of these structures, if not of term limits themselves. Yet even if public
sentiment does not shift in favor of eliminating legislative term limits, it seems
nonetheless fair to say that term limits are not delivering all that was promised,
especially in diversifying our elected representatives and reducing the influence of
campaign financing on state legislative processes.

